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This dissertation is comprised of two essays that incorporate social networks into the 
analyses of marketing strategies and phenomena to develop a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of the marketing environment, and to enhance manager’s ability to forecast a firm 
or brand’s performance in the digital domain. The first essay explores the impact of marketing 
alliance announcements on firm equity risk given a network of previous strategic alliances for 
both a focal firm and its partner. Results confirm a widely held belief in the literature that 
marketing alliances have risk-reducing benefits, but only for those alliances involving a new 
partner. Furthermore, at high levels, the interconnectedness of partners or density of a firm’s 
network can cause idiosyncratic risk to increase, while the density of a partner’s network can 
also result in increases in systematic risk of a firm after alliance formation. The second essay 
proposes a novel method for using social media monitoring in a forward-looking manner to 
forecast brands’ future online WOM valence. The method infers associative relations between 
brands from social media monitoring data by observing which brands are mentioned at the same 
time in the same social media sources. This is used to construct time-varying brand “networks” 
from which forecasting variables are extracted. The method is empirically validated on social 
media monitoring data for 77 major consumer electronics brands over 16 months, and provides 
reasonably accurate forecasts for positive and, in particular, negative WOM valence. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
From 1997 to 2010, MSI’s research priorities pointed to the importance of linking 
marketing actions to financial results for the firm. The resulting research stream provided 
frameworks for the analysis of marketing’s impact (Rust, Ambler, Carpenter, Kumar and 
Srivastava 2004; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1997, 1998), as well as extensive support for 
the notion that marketing activity impacts overall firm performance and value in financial 
markets, whether through advertising (Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso, and Hanssens 2009; 
Joshi and Hanssens 2010), improvements to consumer satisfaction (Fornell et al 2006; Luo and 
Batthacharya 2006), developing a focus on service (Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008), or 
focusing on brands (Morgan and Rego 2009; Mizik and Jacobson 2009). 
However, the marketing concept holds that the marketing function is a consideration of 
relationships, and as such the discussion of marketing’s impact on firm performance should 
benefit from the consideration of more complex relationships between entities outside of 
traditional firm boundaries. In fact, the most commonly thought-of assets under the control of a 
marketing manager, such as consumer, brand, and channel-equities are market-based (Hanssens, 
Rust, and Srivastava 2009); meaning that they don’t reside within the firm, but are rather 
intangible items that are co-created with a variety of external entities.  
For example, a consumer’s brand equity is a function of the strength, valence and 
uniqueness of the associations the consumer has made with the brand (Keller 1993), under some 
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influence from the firm’s marketing efforts. This equity value explains the propensity of 
purchase, and if aggregated across all consumers, will also offer a good explanation for the 
volume of goods sold, revenues generated, and any volatility observed (if we consider these 
revenues over time). However, consumers do not hold these brand-associations in a vacuum. 
Rather, consumers live in a world filled with interactions, where they can both influence and be 
influenced by other consumers, alternative brands, and competitive or cooperative marketing 
efforts. Therefore, it is not surprising that social network theory (which allows us to chart, 
quantify, and study these interaction) found applications in the marketing literature. In fact, 
network concepts should not be just useful to managers in connecting firm action to firm 
performance (Swaminathan and Moorman 2009, Stephen and Toubia 2010), but also in the 
development of managerial tools and procedures that allow them to generate at least temporary 
competitive advantage in the market and improve firm performance. 
1.1 SOCIAL NETWORK INFORMATION: RELATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL 
Information is one of the mechanisms by which a network has the ability to improve firm 
performance (Gulati 1998), meaning that membership, and perhaps position within a given 
network can give rise to a situation where there is asymmetry in information. This asymmetry 
then allows for arbitrage around the information itself, or creates a window of opportunity for 
competitive advantage to be created, thus generating value and enhancing performance. This 
information can arrive either due to relational or structural benefits (Granoveter 1992).  
Relational benefits rely on the strength of the tie between two members of a network. 
Assuming, just momentarily for exposition, that we are dealing with a network of firms. A strong 
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tie between two firms would indicate a greater degree of collaboration, more integrated systems, 
a longer history of working together, etc. Strong ties facilitate the flow of information between 
these firms, allowing for more tacit knowledge transfers, and greater trust (Rowley, Behrens, and 
Krackhardt 2000). However, Granoverter (1973) argued that strong ties would also provide more 
redundant (rather than novel) information. In contrast, weak ties, exemplified by shallower and 
more infrequent inter-firm communications, represent connections to more dissimilar firms with 
access to more novel knowledge. Given this contradictory nature of the strength of ties (i.e., high 
quality connection with redundant information versus a low quality connection with novel 
information), Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) explain that the firm’s environment, and 
its intended goals at a specific point in time dictate the value of the strength of a tie. 
Alternatively, informational benefits can be derived from a structural perspective, which 
takes into account the position of the firm relative to other members of the network. In this 
perspective, a firm might be positioned in such a way that it connects two groups, or clusters of 
other firms that would not have been connected otherwise. This position of brokerage allows the 
connecting firm the aforementioned arbitrage opportunity on information it receives from either 
of the separate groups (Gulati 1998).  
1.2 THE SOCIAL NETWORK AS INFORMATION 
Lastly, it is worth noting that additional information can be derived from analysis of the 
social network itself, given the accumulation and pattern of connections between all members. 
This shift in perspective from network-member benefitting from information flows within the 
network (relational or structural), to network-observer provides incremental benefits for the firm 
 4 
when we consider the ability to absorb new information, even from networks where the firm 
does not directly participate in as a member, such as consumer or brand networks. 
 Assuming that connections in marketing-relevant networks, such as consumer, brand, or 
firm networks, are not randomly generated, but rather arise due to choice or strategic action; 
then, analyses of these network can yield relevant and actionable managerial information to aid 
in the development of marketing strategies that will drive firm performance, and value. 
This dissertation builds on the research studying the impact of social networks on 
marketing practice in two meaningful ways. First, I add to the discussion on the impact of 
marketing alliances, and marketing alliance networks on firm risk. While much of the previous 
research has emphasized that strategic alliances contribute to reduction of risks because 
uncertainties are shared across firms, reducing the risk exposure of any one firm, empirical 
support for this view is limited. For example, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993, p. 43) argue 
“alliances provide a superior vehicle for gaining access to new complementary products or 
technologies without all the risks of internal development.” Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 
(2000, p. 371) echo this view that “firms enter strategic alliances to gain access to external 
resources [and] share risks.” While Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003, p. 422) suggest that 
“advocates of interfirm cooperation argue that alliances, joint ventures, and other forms of 
cooperation are largely procompetitive because they help firms reduce risk.” Similar claims have 
been made in the strategy literature in which one of the touted advantages of strategic alliances is 
the “risk-sharing” component (Hagedoorn 1993; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). 
Despite the widespread belief that strategic alliances are mechanisms for risk reduction, Das, 
Sen, and Sengupta (1998) find that marketing alliances contribute to an increase in risk. To 
resolve these incongruences, this dissertation provides an empirical examination of the marketing 
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alliance impact on separate components of equity risk, taking into consideration the pattern of 
connections in the alliance network where the firm is embedded. 
I find that while a novel alliance reduces both the firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks, any subsequent alliances with the same partner do not provide the same benefit. 
Furthermore, the clustering of a firm’s ego network has an exponential impact on idiosyncratic 
risk, first decreasing but rapidly increasing as this interconnectivity grows. Conversely, 
systematic risk increases at a decreasing rate as a function of one’s partner’s clustering. So, 
contrary to the widespread belief that marketing alliances are good vehicles for risk reduction, 
this study demonstrates that they are only conditionally so, and highlights situations where 
managers could be unwittingly increasing the firm’s risk exposure without a commensurate 
increase in value. 
This analysis also suggests that a manager looking for a new marketing alliance partner 
(whether for a joint promotion, co-branding, or joint sales program) can adopt a network-as-
information perspective and screen for potential partners on the additional basis of which 
network position each firm occupies, as well as which overall network structure would be 
created with the alliance. Careful selection of partners on this basis could give rise to greater 
abnormal returns in the financial markets (Swaminathan and Moorman 2009), as well as lower 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Lastly, I explore the network-as-information concept in a different domain where 
enhanced marketing strategy can improve firm performance and create firm value: social media. 
Firms are currently facing decisions about an entirely new, and rapidly evolving environment in 
the digital space, comprised by ecommerce, online discussion forums, social media sites, blogs, 
file-sharing depots and torrents, etc. While few would now argue that this online digital space 
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has a small performance consequence for firms, it might be less obvious that this world has a 
direct and significant impact on real world, brick and mortar performance, be it through media 
use of social media for gathering news, the growing popularity of apps, and mobile interactions. 
As such, understanding and predicting the attitudes of consumers about a brand online should be 
a valuable activity for managers, opening up the possibility to take corrective action before small 
online shifts become larger offline problems. To address this need, this dissertation proposes a 
brand-network enhanced forecast model for online sentiment valence.  
This novel approach to predict online word of mouth valence uses only standard, 
commercially available, social media monitoring data. By considering that brands being 
discussed online don’t exist in vacuum, time varying networks of brands are built based on their 
coexistence in this digital space, and then this relational structure is used to reduce the forecast 
error for a focal brand. The incorporation of information from this digital environment, such as 
the brand’s network degree centrality or ego network clustering, improves predictability and 
extends the forecast window, providing a valuable tool for managers interested in anticipating 
changes in consumers’ positive or negative attitudes towards a brand.  
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2.0  WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND: THE IMPACT OF MARKETING 
ALLIANCES ON FIRM RISK AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF STRUCTURAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS 
In the past decade, the forces of globalization and competition have led to a significant 
shift in the organizational structure of firms, from a stiff hierarchy to a more fluid and 
disaggregated organizational structure comprising internal and external networks. Different from 
hierarchical forms of organization, networked organizations are structured such that innovation 
and marketing coordination takes place at the core and an increasingly large number of strategic 
alliance partners supplement the efforts of the firm in various crucial aspects (e.g., gaining access 
to new markets, developing new products). Achrol and Kotler (1999) predicted that as the 
organizational structure of firms shift from hierarchical forms to networked organizations, 
marketing outcomes would be increasingly determined by competition between networks of 
firms.   
Literature on strategic alliances in marketing has primarily focused on the dyadic level of 
analysis (e.g., Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Houston and Johnson 2000), though recent efforts 
have also explored how networks of interfirm agreements contribute to various aspects of 
performance (e.g., Cui and O’Connor 2012; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009; Wuyts, 
Stremersch, and Dutta 2004). This work is also consistent with the broader trend toward 
understanding how networks can be a source of value to the firm (Grewal, Lilien, and 
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Mallapragada 2006; Mallapragada, Grewal, and Lilien 2011). Despite these important findings, 
much of the previous work on strategic alliances in both marketing and the broader strategy 
literature has focused on value creation; far less research has examined the risk implications of 
strategic alliances.  
  This study examines whether marketing alliances, defined as alliances that enable a firm 
to gain access to new resources, markets, brands, and products (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; 
Swaminathan and Moorman 2009), have an impact on firm risk. It also highlights the role of 
network characteristics (e.g., network density) as a moderator of the relationship between 
marketing alliance formation and firm risk.  
Interfirm network characteristics have important implications for firm risk for three 
reasons. First, anecdotal evidence from financial and banking sector crises (e.g., subprime 
mortgage crisis, Greek debt crisis) indicates that contagion risk can cause whole industries to 
become vulnerable to problems emanating from one or two participants in the network. The 
implication is that a firm’s risk is closely linked to the firms on which it depends for cash flows; 
these firms are strategic alliance partners in the network of interfirm relationships in which the 
focal firm is embedded. Second, the marketing function has a direct impact on the risk profile of 
a firm because volatility of cash flows is often linked to demand uncertainties, and demand 
generation is primarily a marketing function. Thus, understanding how marketing actions (e.g., 
marketing alliances) can affect the risk profile of the firm is crucial. Third, the dependence on 
external partners to fulfill the functions in the firm could lead to greater systematic risk, which 
again could lead to greater covariation of firms’ cash flows with the overall industry; to the 
extent that a firm has chosen to embed itself in a network of tightly linked firms, the network 
could impose significant risks, particularly if the interconnections are so dense that volatility is 
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exacerbated.   
 The expectation that dependence on strategic alliance partners can be problematic for a 
firm stands in stark contrast with how extant literature examines risk implications of strategic 
alliances. Much of the previous research has emphasized that strategic alliances contribute to 
reducing risks because uncertainties are shared across firms, limiting the risk exposure of any 
one firm. For example, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993, p. 43) argue that “alliances provide a 
superior vehicle for gaining access to new complementary products or technologies without all 
the risks of internal development.” Echoing this view, Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt (2000, 
p. 371) state that “firms enter strategic alliances to gain access to external resources [and] share 
risks.” Finally, Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003, p. 422) suggest that “alliances, joint ventures, 
and other forms of cooperation are largely procompetitive because they help firms reduce risk.” 
Researchers in strategy literature have made similar claims, touting one advantage of strategic 
alliances as the “risk-sharing” component (Hagedoorn 1993; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 
2000). Despite widespread agreement that strategic alliances are mechanisms for risk reduction, 
empirical support for this view is limited. Indeed, to our knowledge, only Das, Sen, and 
Sengupta (1998) consider the equity risk consequence of alliances (even if just briefly); in their 
work, they link strategic alliances to stock market returns and find that marketing alliances 
contribute to an increase in risk.     
We aim to empirically examine the relationship between marketing alliances and risk to 
resolve the debate. In contrast with Das, Sen, and Sengupta’s (1998) work, we examine the 
impact of marketing alliances on two components of risk: idiosyncratic and systematic risk. 
More important, we argue that the relationship between strategic marketing alliances and firm 
risk is moderated by structural properties of the network of prior alliances. Our focus is 
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specifically on network density, or the level of interconnectivity among a firm’s partners. We 
examine how a densely interconnected set of actors in a firm’s strategic alliance network 
moderates the relationship between new strategic alliance formation and firm risk.  
  In summary, this research makes three key contributions to the literature. First, we 
examine how strategic marketing alliances contribute to firm risk by disentangling the impact on 
two dimensions of risk. In doing so, we contribute to recent findings regarding the impact of 
marketing actions, specifically advertising and brand equity, on risk (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and 
Bonfrer 2011; McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007; Morgan and Rego 2009; Rego, Billett, and 
Morgan 2009; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008; Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009). Second, we explore the 
moderating role of network density. Third, we examine how repeat partnering moderates the 
impact of alliances on risk. We test these using a database of marketing alliances across various 
industries. We use an event study methodology (similar to Das, Sen, and Sengupta’s [1998] 
study) to measure risk by examining the change in risk before and after the announcement of a 
strategic alliance. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of networked-asset 
management as an emerging skill for marketing managers and the strategies that firms can 
undertake in the formation of their own marketing networks. 
2.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theory of Risk in Marketing 
 Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of marketing actions in reducing 
risk. McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007) describe the impact of advertising and research-and-
development expenditures on reducing the systematic risk of a firm. Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
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(2009) suggest that customer-based brand equity helps reduce idiosyncratic risk and can also 
buffer equity holders from downside systematic risk. Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer (2011) show 
that brand quality reduces firm idiosyncratic risk. More recently, Tarasi et al. (2011) advocate 
incorporating the financial principles of risk to effectively manage a firm’s customer portfolio. 
Taken together, these results suggest that marketing investments in brand building and 
advertising can act as mechanisms for risk reduction. Despite these important contributions, 
extant research has largely focused on marketing assets located within the firm; increasingly, 
firms are attempting to access resources located externally in partner organizations. How does 
the increasing propensity of firms to engage in interorganizational relationships and exchange 
marketing resources affect their equity risk and its two components, idiosyncratic and systematic 
risk? We examine this issue next.  
Equity Risk  
Equity risk, by definition, arises from and resides in the financial/equity market. 
Considered the volatility of a firm’s stock returns, it exists because stock traders (either 
individual investors or institutions) disagree on the true underlying value of the firm (and, with 
it, its stock), thus enabling trades to occur, returns to be realized, and volatility to exist. To fall 
on the profitable side of these disagreements, traders use all the information available to them. 
In line with this argument, Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009, p. 294) state that within this 
“well-known efficient markets hypothesis … in finance, these investor reactions fully and 
accurately incorporate any new information that has value relevance. Thus, insofar as marketing 
drives product-market performance, new marketing developments could be value relevant.” 
Kimbrough and McAlister (2009, p. 316) echo this statement by arguing that short-window event 
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studies are ideally suited to inferring causality and provide for “more direct causal inferences 
about the source of the information on which investors rely.” 
Thus, a novel marketing alliance announcement should provide new information for the 
entire market on the firm’s ability and plans to generate future profits, allowing competing 
traders to model new alternative firm values and execute trades—giving rise to divergent 
amounts of equity risk. In hypothesizing the impact of marketing alliance announcements, we 
adopt this perspective of a trader/investor analyzing future performance consequences due to 
novel information.  
Marketing Alliances and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 The idiosyncratic risk component of equity risk accounts for a firm’s own volatility and 
other firm-specific factors unrelated to the broader financial market (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
2009; Shin and Stulz 2000). Firms enter into marketing alliances to gain access to new resources, 
markets, brands, and products (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009). 
Therefore, marketing alliances help diversify a firm’s product portfolio and expand its 
geographic reach, both of which reduce the volatility of the firm’s demand. Thus, investors 
evaluating a marketing alliance announcement will generate new value expectations based on 
firm-specific factors, which in turn will impact the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. But should 
idiosyncratic risk increase or decrease with information from a new alliance?  
Marketing alliances can be a diversifying force, helping the firm gain access to new 
markets or products through external partnerships rather than through costly internal 
development. To the degree that these new acquisitions are unrelated to the firm’s previous 
market or product offerings, the firm’s cash flow volatility should decrease. For example, the 
U.S. toy manufacturer Hasbro partnered with Gameloft, a French game developer, to leverage 
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some of its intellectual property (My Little Pony and Littlest Pet Shop) on mobile gaming 
platforms (Hasbro 2012). This agreement extended Hasbro’s portfolio into digital gaming, in 
which revenues increased more than 4% in 2011, while the toy industry in the United States 
experienced a 2% decline in the same period (NPD Group 2012; PricewaterhouseCooper 2012). 
In this case, Hasbro entered into an alliance to increase the number of product categories it 
operates in, making up for any downsides in one business with upsides in a different category. 
By combining unrelated (or, at least, imperfectly related) businesses or markets, a firm can 
reduce the volatility of its cash flows and, by doing so, reduce its idiosyncratic risk. 
Marketing alliances can also strengthen a firm’s positioning and increase its brand equity 
by acquiring new brand associations, as in the case of cobranding alliances. To the extent that 
these new associations increase the brand’s equity, the firm’s volatility and idiosyncratic risk 
should decrease (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). This decrease in volatility comes from a more 
stable cash flow stream due to greater consumer loyalty (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001), repeat-
buying patterns (Keller 2003), and a decrease in brand substitution (McAlister, Srinivasan, and 
Kim 2007). 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the benefits of alliances due to 
diversification and stronger brand equity have a significant impact on reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
Announcements of marketing alliances should signal greater stability of cash flows in the future 
brought by a diversified consumer base (Tarasi et al. 2011) and strong brands (Rego, Billett, and 
Morgan 2009). Therefore, when a marketing alliance is announced, investors should update their 
beliefs or expectations in such a way that helps reduce the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Thus: 
H1: A firm’s idiosyncratic risk decreases after a marketing alliance 
announcement.  
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Marketing Alliances and Systematic Risk 
The systematic component of equity risk is indicative of the firm’s exposure to 
macrolevel economic risks, such as fluctuations in currency exchange rates, the price of energy, 
and interest rates (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2008; Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). Firms can 
buffer themselves from these broader market shocks with certain marketing initiatives and assets, 
such as advertising (McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007) and brand equity (Rego, Billett, and 
Morgan 2009), but can also increase their exposure as a result of others, such as brand quality 
(Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011). How, then, do marketing alliances affect the firm’s 
systematic risk? 
If the alliance serves as a diversifying force for the firm (e.g., new markets, new 
products), the firm will enhance its economic footprint, in turn potentially increasing the number 
of macroeconomic forces to which it is susceptible. For example, the alliance between Hasbro 
and Gameloft, which stabilized Hasbro’s cash flows through participation in the digital gaming 
market, might also have caused Hasbro to worry about the dollar/euro exchange rate, which has 
implications for the timing of currency exchanges and, thus, profitability between the firms. As 
such, the increasing responsiveness of firm performance and returns to macroeconomic forces 
translate into greater systematic risk (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2008). 
The increase in uncertainty from the reliance on partners can also increase systematic risk 
because an unrelated partner firm brings a different set of macroeconomic vulnerabilities (e.g., 
exchange rate, interest rate) to be “shared” in the alliance (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 
2000). Therefore, underperformance from a partner due to a market-level event will affect the 
firm’s own performance (conditional on its interdependencies) and, with it, the extent to which it 
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can respond to macroeconomic forces, increasing systematic risk. Thus, as a firm diversifies 
through its alliances and increases its reliance on partners, based on aforementioned arguments, 
investors will react to announcements of marketing alliances such that systematic risk increases.  
H2: A firm’s systematic risk increases after a marketing alliance announcement. 
 
Repeat Partnering  
We move beyond dyadic relationships and consider a more complete network of alliances 
(Gulati 1998; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009). The alliance network perspective, originally 
suggested by Gulati (1998), incorporates the firm’s direct partnerships and their 
interdependencies (similar to a portfolio) but also accounts for both the partner’s connections and 
other accumulating connections, extending beyond the appropriate interdependencies. These 
types of networks paint a more complex picture and also provide a dynamic view of forces 
influencing the firm and partner actions (Granovetter 1985; Gulati 1998; Yang, Lin, and Lin 
2010). Previous studies of firm networks have considered two types of additional information 
arising from the network structure: relational and structural (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; 
Swaminathan and Moorman 2009). 
Relational characteristics are associated with the strength of ties between firms in a social 
network (Granovetter 1973), which determines the degree of trust in the relationship and the 
likelihood and ease of transferring information (Gulati 1995, 1998). Firms that share a strong 
alliance connection are also more likely to act, and react, in a similar manner (Gulati 1998). This 
similarity calls to question the portfolio assumption of stable correlations, especially as firms 
engage in repeated partnerships and agreements. How, then, does a repeat partnership affect the 
two types of risk important to investors? 
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Recall that we previously argued that idiosyncratic risk, or firm-specific risk, should 
decrease after a marketing alliance because of either a diversification or a brand equity–
strengthening effect. Firms can achieve diversification by tapping into assets uncorrelated with 
their own (e.g., entering new markets, acquiring new products or brands). Brand equity can be 
strengthened through new brand associations in a cobranding relationship. Furthermore, new 
partnerships give firms access to novel information, and the knowledge acquired through such 
partnerships leads to new knowledge, which is critical to success in uncertain environments 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003; Duysters 1996; Goerzen 2007). However, none of these 
mechanisms apply when a firm forms an alliance with a preexisting/current partner. Because 
both proposed mechanisms rely on the acquisition of or access to a novel asset, increasing 
commitment to one specific asset already accessed should not have any beneficial effects of 
lowering a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. 
We also hypothesized that a firm’s systematic risk exposure should increase because the 
firm is now exposed to various macroeconomic forces that can indirectly influence its cash 
flows. When a firm enters into a repeat partnership, the previously mentioned impact on 
systematic risk does not hold true, because the firm has already become susceptible to the 
broader forces that influence its partner, by virtue of a past partnership.  
Although repeat alliances could involve different functional areas from firms in the 
original alliance, the mechanism by which risk arises is still dependent on whether the partners 
establish a correlation between their revenue streams. If the correlation has already been 
established (from a previously announced alliance), a level of dependence already exists between 
the partners in terms of their revenues. If the new repeat partnership involves a different 
functional area, new increases in correlation could arise, but this increase would likely to be 
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lower than in a brand-new partnership. Therefore, we expect that the hypothesized impact of 
marketing alliance formation on idiosyncratic and systematic risks will hold only for a firm’s 
new connections. 
H3a: The decrease in idiosyncratic risk after a marketing alliance announcement 
holds only for a new partnership, not for a repeat partnership.  
 
H3b: The increase in systematic risk after a marketing alliance announcement 
holds only for a new partnership, not for a repeat partnership.  
 
Network Density   
 Density refers to the connectivity among a firm’s partners. In addition to relational 
benefits, the firm can benefit from its position in the alliance network. Maintaining connections 
with distinct parts of the alliance network can provide further diversification to the firm, giving it 
access to novel and nonredundant information, which is beneficial for remaining innovative 
(Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000), enhancing its position from brokering the information 
transfer (Burt 1992, 2001), and sustaining performance levels during periods of environmental 
change and uncertainty (Koka and Prescott 2008). Achrol and Kotler (1999, p. 147) argue that 
networked firms experience a reduction in risk exposure because “environmental disturbances 
transfer imperfectly through loosely coupled networks and tend to dissipate in intensity as they 
spread through the system,” resulting in a situation in which “each unit in the network must deal 
with a small component of the disturbance.”  
Among the many sociometric measures used to describe an actor’s position in a network, 
prior research has shown that degree centrality (the number of direct partners) and density (the 
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number of connections between partners as a proportion of possible connections) have a 
significant impact on a firm’s results and returns (Stephen and Toubia 2010; Swaminathan and 
Moorman 2009). So, what are the possible downsides of these network structures? Although 
prior research has highlighted many positive aspects of density, some of these recognized 
benefits can have a dark side in terms of a firm’s risk exposure. Density increases the structural 
stability of the network (Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley 2003; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007), 
which is accomplished through the formation of cliques, or subgroups, that are more 
interconnected than linked to external partners. This cliquelike behavior facilitates the exchange 
of information between firms and increases the incidence of joint activity and cooperation 
(Coleman 1988, 1990; Uzzi 1996). Therefore, network density can lower idiosyncratic risk 
However, at higher levels of network density, this joint activity and cooperation can 
translate into more incidences of overlapping markets, customers, and brands. Such an overlap 
can lead to an increase in the correlation in the performances of these firms; as this correlation 
increases, the diversification of their portfolios/networks decreases. Indeed, Achrol and Kotler 
(1999) contend that at very high levels of density, a clique of firms approximates a singular, 
undiversified superstructure or a “networked entity.” 
Furthermore, high levels of density works against Burt’s (1992) concept of structural 
holes by erasing the brokerage positional advantage of the firm as its partners form direct 
connections to one another. This vanishing advantage compromises the value of the information 
the firm can access from its network, which affects its ability to navigate in uncertain 
environments. This also reduces the amount of power and control the firm can exert over its 
network, thus lowering its ability to use partnerships as tools in risk-mitigation strategies and 
rendering it more prone to operational uncertainty.  
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Thus, as partner firms become more interconnected, they first stabilize partnerships and 
facilitate the exchange of information, which can reduce uncertainty. However, as density 
increases, firms begin to act similarly and resemble each other, diminishing the impact of 
diversification and brand equity strengthening, which had originally contributed to a decrease in 
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and lowering their ability to use their network as a protective barrier 
against operational uncertainty. Therefore, as the partner firm’s network density increases, its 
idiosyncratic risk should initially decrease but then increase: 
H4: A firm’s alliance network density has a curvilinear impact on its idiosyncratic 
risk following a marketing alliance announcement. Specifically, at low levels of network 
density, idiosyncratic risk decreases, and at high levels, idiosyncratic risk increases. 
 
 
Partner Network Density 
 
One factor that may exacerbate the risk inherent in a strategic alliance is the role of a 
partner’s network characteristics. A large part of the uncertainty in alliances stems from the 
notion that a partner is an independent, active, and strategic actor (Das and Teng 2001; Yang, 
Lin, and Lin 2010). As an active player, the partner firm manages its own network of alliances to 
maximize its returns and minimize its risk exposure. Therefore, as the partner firm uses its 
network to change its own risk profile, it also changes the amount of risk it brings into the 
alliance to be “shared” (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). 
One such shared risk factor, as we have argued, is the number of additional 
vulnerabilities to market forces brought by the partner firm. When a firm diversifies through its 
partner, it also assumes its vulnerabilities, thus becoming more exposed to a wider variety of 
market forces and, by definition, suffering from greater systematic risk. That is, as the partner’s 
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network density increases, the firm’s systematic risk also increases because of the 
undiversification of the partner’s position and a subsequent reduction in the differentiation 
provided by the alliance. However, at high levels of density, the detrimental impact of this 
reduction in differentiation should occur at a decreasing rate, simply because of the nature of 
network density itself. To approach its maximum level, network density requires that all firms 
have a connection with all other firms, which reduces the novelty of the macroeconomic forces. 
In addition, this connection exacerbates issues that were present in other previously established 
connections. 
 These arguments imply that while a partner’s dense network exposes the firm to more 
market forces, the increase in systematic risk due to a dense partner network likely manifests at a 
decreasing rate owing to the process of network creation. Thus: 
 
H5: A partner’s network density has a nonlinear impact on the firm’s systematic 
risk following a marketing alliance announcement. Specifically, at low levels of network 
density, systematic risk increases, and at high levels of network density, systematic risk 
increases at a decreasing rate. 
 
2.2 METHOD 
Event Studies of Risk 
To examine the relationship between strategic alliances and the risk profile of a firm, we 
use the event study approach to assess changes to a firm’s risk. This methodology is new to 
marketing, though it has a long history in finance literature. For example, Kalay and 
Loewenstein (1985) examine the changes in equity risk surrounding dividend announcements, 
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using event windows extending 34 days before and after the announcement. Brown, Harlow, and 
Tinic (1988) analyze information uncertainty with a similar methodology but use event windows 
extending over 60 days. More recently, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2010) examine 
dynamics of risk before and after a seasoned equity offering. Across all these studies, an event 
study approach to risk involves comparing risk before and after a significant event. We employ 
this approach in a marketing context to examine how marketing alliance announcements 
influence a firm’s risk exposure.  
2.2.1 Data  
Following Swaminathan and Moorman’s (2009) work on the impact of alliance networks 
on returns, we collected data on strategic alliances from the SDC Joint Ventures/Strategic 
Alliances database, which provides descriptions of the alliance and participants. We gathered 
stock performance data from CRSP and other firm information from COMPUSTAT. We 
retrieved Fama–French factors from Kenneth French’s web-based data library. 
Our sample consisted of firms from five different industries (i.e., automotive, electronics, 
software development, telecommunications, and power generation) that announced marketing 
alliances from 1988 to 2008, while Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) focused on a single 
industry. From our original list of alliances, we extracted the results for all partners separately, 
which yielded two data points per partnership announcement. We deleted partnerships that 
included more than two partners or those that involved private partners. We also deleted firms 
for which we could not obtain network, partner network, or firm data. Finally, we deleted firms 
without a credit rating for the year of the alliance, which provides an indication of their cash flow 
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vulnerabilities (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). This process yielded a final sample of 251 
firm-specific results for analysis. 
2.2.2 Measures 
Idiosyncratic risk. Both our dependent variables are functions of the components of the 
total financial risk facing shareholders—that is, equity risk. We take equity risk as the standard 
deviation in the returns for a given security. We calculate the first component of equity risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, by taking the standard deviation of the residual of the Carhart- (1997) 
modified Fama–French model (Fama and French 1993, 1996): 
rit = βi + βirmt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + uiUMDt + ei,t,                      (1) 
where rmt is the market return, SMBt are the differential returns to portfolios comprising 
small versus large capitalization firms, HMLt are the differential returns to portfolios comprising 
high versus low market-to-book ratio firms, and UMDt are the differential returns to portfolios 
comprising firms with high versus low prior returns.1 
To determine the change in firm idiosyncratic risk, we followed the approach Das, Sen, 
and Sengupta (1998) use by first calculating the firm idiosyncratic risk for the period between –
60 trading days and –10 trading days, using the alliance announcement as the day 0 reference 
point. This is the prealliance firm-specific risk. We then repeat the procedure for the period from 
+10 trading days to +60 trading days after the announcement, which gives us the postalliance 
                                                
1 Although the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe 1964) is a potential alternative to the Fama–French model used 
herein, it would require a significantly greater amount of data to generate the required market portfolio (which, in 
principle, should expand beyond stocks to include bonds, durables, real state, labor, and so on) to match or surpass 
the Fama–French model’s ability to predict returns. As such, our chosen model provides a more efficient approach 
to minimizing residuals and the most conservative estimates of risk. 
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firm-specific risk. The difference between these two measures is our first dependent variable to 
be used in Model 1. 
Systematic risk. We calculate the second component, systematic risk, by subtracting the 
squared standard deviation in the errors from the squared standard deviation in returns (e.g., 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee 1994; Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). We follow an identical 
procedure to arrive at the change in systematic risk. That is, we calculate the preannouncement 
firm systematic risk for the period between –60 trading days and –10 trading days, before the 
alliance announcement (day 0). As previously, the calculation of the period from +10 trading 
days to +60 trading days is the postannouncement systematic risk component. The difference 
between the values in these two periods is our measure of the change in systematic risk, our 
second dependent variable, to be used in Model 2.   
Independent Variables 
When possible, we follow Swaminathan and Moorman’s (2009) selection and 
specification of variables; they present the impact of alliance networks on returns, and we aim to 
present the counterpoint with respect to firm risk. However, this risk perspective also 
necessitates its own considerations that diverge from Swaminathan and Moorman’s original 
work, as we discuss next.  
Repeat partnership. To differentiate alliances that have a structural impact from those 
that reinforce preexisting network ties, we must account for the existence of these connections. 
Repeat partnership is an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 if the two firms involved in 
the alliance announcement have previously engaged in a strategic alliance (given by any, related 
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or unrelated, alliance announcement containing both firms in the five years preceding this new 
announcement) and a value of 0 if otherwise.2  
Network density. We calculate network density as the number of connections among all 
firms in a focal firm’s network divided by the total number of possible connections among these 
firms (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). We mean-centered this value by firm before 
entering it into the model.3 Network densities in our data range from 0 to 1, with the average firm 
having a value of .437. While 75% of the firms we observe have densities below .6, 10% of all 
firms in the data have network density values of 1. 
Partner firm network density. Partner firm network density is identical to the focal firm’s 
network density, except that the partner firm is at the center of the network. We treat firms as 
both focal (when explaining own returns and risk differencing) and partners (when explaining 
partner firm’s return and risk differencing). We account for the nonindependence created by 
these observations by the use of hierarchical linear modeling. 
Control Variables 
Alliance returns. To capture the risk differencing arising solely from the connection 
between firms, we control for the expected risk differencing arising from the extra value 
generated during the event window of the alliance announcement. This control absorbs any 
change in equity risk expected from the changes to the underlying value of the assets in question, 
thus accounting for the higher risk associated with greater returns (Markowitz 1952). We 
calculate the abnormal returns arising from the alliance announcement by subtracting the 
                                                
2 This dichotomous approach to repeat alliances is meant to capture only the structural component of the connection between the firms. An 
alternative, continuous measure (e.g., number of previous alliances) would instead capture a relational component that begins to approach 
measures of tie strength. Although our study does not address relational considerations, we provide some insights using this alternative 
specification as a robustness check.     
3 Mean-centering by group is a standard practice in hierarchical linear modeling designed to simplify interpretation of the results, especially for 
models containing variables for which values of 0 are either impossible or nonsensical. Under this centering option, an intercept π0jk is equivalent 
to the unadjusted mean for firm j, and the variance is modeled around each firm’s individual position (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  
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expected returns from the observed returns in an event window of –1 and +1 days surrounding 
the announcement of the new alliance. We calculate the expected returns by applying the 
Carhart-modified Fama–French model given in Equation 1, using a window of –300 to –60 days 
to the alliance announcement as an estimation period for each firm’s coefficients. 
Horizontal alliances. The type of alliance could have a significant impact on firm risk, 
and strategic alliances have traditionally been distinguished between vertical and horizontal 
strategic alliances (Rindfleisch 2000). Vertical alliances involve strategic alliances with either 
upstream suppliers or downstream customers of the focal firm (Dyer 1996; Lorenzoni and 
Lipparini 1999). In contrast, horizontal relationships are typically within-industry alliances, such 
that both partners occupy a similar point on the value chain (Ahuja 2000; Jap 1999). We include 
an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 if both partners are active in the same industry, as 
determined by a two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code, and a value of 0 if otherwise. 
 Marketing alliance types. Using detailed alliance announcement information, each 
alliance was coded by two MBA students. The coders were instructed to indicate any and all the 
types of alliances described below that matched the description of the alliance given in the 
official announcement. Note that the same alliance could have multiple types assigned to it. The 
overall interrater agreement was 83%, and disagreements were resolved by a third coder. The 
following points summarize the distribution of alliances in our sample and provide a brief 
description of the different types of alliances. Broadly, the alliance motives revolve around 
product development–/integration-based motives and market development–/access-based 
motives: 
1. Product development (27%): The alliance was formed so that the two companies could 
develop a joint product. 
 
2. Product integration (20%): The alliance was formed for the purpose of integrating two 
 26 
products (e.g., hardware, software). 
 
3. Joint marketing (53%): The firms jointly market their offerings to the target customers. 
 
4. Market access (21%): The alliance helps the firm gain access to new geographic regions 
or target markets. 
 
5. Other: Other motives for the alliance include licensing (2%), customer service (4%), 
sales (12%), bundling (4%), and international (5%). 
 
Prior firm credit rating. To conduct a more complete assessment of the firm’s overall 
risk, we include its credit rating in the year before the alliance announcement. This quantifies the 
firm’s default risk to debt holders. The variable ranges from 2 (equivalent to a credit rating of 
AAA) to 27 (equivalent to a credit rating of D); the higher the value, the more risk the firm has.  
Network centrality. Network centrality refers to a firm’s degree centrality, or the number 
of firms with which the focal firm is directly connected (Freeman 1979). This is an important 
variable in the alliance context (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Gulati, Lavie, and Madhavan 
2011; Yang, Lin, and Peng 2011) because it enables us to control for the effect of the size of a 
firm’s network on firm risk.  
Network efficiency. The efficiency of a network serves as an indication of the 
nonredundant knowledge available in a network (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; 
Granovetter 1973; Mason and Watts 2012) and has been shown to influence various firm 
outcome measures, such as innovation and sales (e.g., Yu, Gilbert, and Oviatt 2011). We 
calculate this measure with a variation of the Hirschman–Herfindahl index, capturing the 
proportion of partners in the firm’s network from nonoverlapping industries (determined by the 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code).  
Network strength. The strength of a network is an indication of the quality of the alliance 
portfolio. We measure network strength on the basis of the average quality of a partner in a 
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network. We construct the measure by using a firm’s membership in Fortune’s Top 100 list, 
which assumes a value of 1 on an appearance and 0 otherwise. The final value of network 
strength is the average reputation score across partners in a firm’s network (Houston and Johnson 
2000). 
Selectivity bias. We model selectivity bias in two stages: the bias in a firm’s propensity to 
enter into alliances and the bias in selecting partners with specific characteristics. In the first 
stage, we use a probit equation to account for the firm’s propensity to enter into alliances (for 
details, see Appendix A). We then employ the inverse Mills ratio from this equation and include 
it in the second stage. 
In the second stage, we specifically control for selection bias to rule out the possibility 
that the results we observe are primarily due to the selection of partners with specific 
characteristics. To do this, we calculate an inverse Mills ratio by estimating a selection equation 
in which we model the probability of choosing a particular partner from a set of available similar 
partners in that industry in that year (again, for details of this estimation and results, see 
Appendix A). 
2.2.3 Model Development 
We apply a three-level specification of a hierarchical linear model to test our hypotheses. 
Hierarchical linear modeling is an appropriate methodology in this case because (1) our data are 
nested, so that multiple alliances involving the same unique firm can occur in the same calendar 
year; (2) the data are unbalanced, in that some firms repeatedly engage in alliances throughout 
our observation period, while others engage in a single partnership during the same period; and 
(3) it allows for a direct interpretation of our coefficients as well as a simpler but robust test of 
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our hypotheses. We also considered the application of a vector autoregressive model, given its 
growing acceptance in marketing literature and its strength in dealing with questions on market 
performance. Thus far, however, this specification is unable to handle the panel structure 
required for our analysis. We estimate the model individually for each of our dependent 
variables, which are represented by Yijk. In the simpler hierarchical notation, the model 
employed is as follows: 
Level 1: Alliance  
 
Yijk = π0jk + π1jk(Abnormal returns)1ijk + π2jk(Horizontal alliance)2ijk + π3jk(Repeat 
partner)3ijk + π4jk(Product development)4ijk + π5jk(Product integration)5ijk + π6jk(Joint 
Marketing)6ijk + π7jk(Market Access)7ijk + π8jk(Other Alliances)8ijk + eijk, 
 
where each variable is given for alliance i, firm j, in year k and eijk is the deviation of the 
alliance from its predicted score based on the Level 1 model.  
Level 2: Firm  
 
πpjk = βp0k + βp1k(Credit rating)p1k + βp2k(Centrality)p2k + βp3k(Density)p3k + 
βp4k(Density2)p4k + βp5k(Efficiency)p5k + βp6k(Strength)p6k + βp7k(Partner density)p7k + βp8k(Partner 
density2)p8k + βp9k(Partner selectivity bias)p9k + rpjk, 
 
where the intercept βp0k indicates the change in firm risk (idiosyncratic or systematic) 
arising from the alliance and rpjk is the random effect representing the firm’s deviation in these 
risk differences. 
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Level 3: Year 
 
βpqk = ϒpq0 + upqk, 
 
where q = 0 through 8, indicating each of the Level 2 variables, and upqk is the random 
effect representing the yearly deviation in each Level 2 coefficient.  
We also estimated additional models to account for the interaction between alliance types 
and firm network characteristics. These models are also hierarchical linear models following the 
specification of our main models, similarly estimated for systematic and idiosyncratic risk. 
However, they differ in two ways: First, we simplify alliance types into a product type 
(combining product development and integration) and market type (combining joint marketing 
and market access); second, we include additional terms for the interaction of the simplified 
types with the four network density measures (Network density, Network density2, Partner firm’s 
network density, and Partner firm’s network density2).4 
2.3 RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the correlations between variables in our study. Table 2 presents the 
coefficients, t-values, and associated significance levels estimated for our model, repeated for 
differences in idiosyncratic and systematic risks. To test out hypotheses, we model the change of 
                                                
4 This simplification is necessary for the models to converge because the across-level interactions add 4 new 
parameters by type of alliance (simplified classification adds 8) to the original specification’s 20 new parameters. 
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risk as a function of the alliance announcement, the type of alliance, firm network characteristics, 
and the change in value derived from the alliance.  
 
Table 1 Correlation Table 
 
2.3.1 Change in Idiosyncratic Risk (Model 1)  
Model 1, which explores the factors influencing the change in idiosyncratic risk in Table 
2, is a significant improvement (–2LL = 770, d.f. = 18, χ2 = 44.27, p < .01) over the null 
specified model (–2LL =1238, d.f. = 4). The random components of the model are also 
significant (χ2 = 38.16, p < .001), providing support for the appropriateness of modeling the 
alliance, firm-, and time-specific factors that affect the change in idiosyncratic risk after an 
alliance announcement. Furthermore, the addition of our predictors enables us to explain 
approximately 98.77% of the variability observed between alliances, 98.59% of the variability 
between firms, and 21.58% of the variability over time (as a reduction in the residuals eijk, rpjk, 
and spjk). The intercept is significant and negative (π0jk = –.026, p < .01), indicating that a firm in  
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Table 2 Change in Firm Equity Risk Following a Marketing Alliance Announcement 
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an average network position experiences a decrease in its idiosyncratic risk after an alliance 
announcement. This finding provides support for H1.  
Of the control variables, alliance abnormal returns are significant and positive (π1jk = 
.042, p < .01), confirming the expected relationship between greater returns and increased risk. 
Several of the variables are not significant, including horizontal alliances (π2jk = .000, n.s.); 
network efficiency (βp5k = –.003, n.s.); alliance-type dummies, including product integration (π5jk 
= .000, n.s.); and joint marketing (π6jk = –.001, n.s.). Only the market access dummy variable is 
significant (π7jk = .003, p < .05), although the product development alliance dummy is positive 
and marginally significant (π4jk = .003, p < .10). Firm credit rating (βp1k = .000, n.s.) and degree 
centrality (βp2k = .000, n.s.) are not significant. The relationship between network strength and 
change in risk is marginally significant (βp6k = .002, p < .10).  
  Furthermore, we find that repeat partnerships have a significant and positive coefficient 
(π3jk = .022, p < .001), which negates the risk reduction advantages of strategic alliances. This 
result provides support for H3a. We posited that network density would have a significant, 
nonlinear impact on the change in idiosyncratic risk. We find evidence of a nonlinear impact; 
network density has a negative and significant impact (βp3k = –.006, p < .05) on the change in 
idiosyncratic risk after an alliance announcement, and squared network density has a positive and 
significant impact (βp4k = .015, p < .05). Figure 1 graphs these results. As this representation 
shows, firms experience a decrease in their idiosyncratic risk at the lowest levels of density in 
their networks, but as density increases, so does their idiosyncratic risk. This result provides 
support for H4.  
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Figure 1 Impact of Network Density on Focal Firm’s Idiosyncratic Risk 
2.3.2 Change in Systematic Risk (Model 2)  
Model 2, which explores the change in systematic risk after a strategic alliance, is also a 
significant improvement (–2LL = 1029, d.f. = 18, χ2 = 29.87, p < .001) over the null model (–
2LL =1768, d.f. = 4). In this specification, the random components are also significant, and the 
proportion of variance explained by our independent variables is essentially unchanged from that 
in Model 1. 
  In Model 2, the impact of alliance abnormal returns on risk is not significant (π1jk = .000, 
n.s.), which suggests that increases in returns are not necessarily associated with greater levels of 
systematic risk. The intercept for Model 2 is not significant (π0jk = –.011, n.s.), indicating that a 
firm in an average network position experiences no change in systematic risk after an alliance 
announcement, offering no support for H2. Repeat partnership has no impact on systematic risk 
(π3jk = .009, n.s.), which offers no support for H3b, a hypothesis that was conditional on the 
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unsupported H2 discussed above. Firm credit rating, horizontal alliance, and partner selectivity 
bias are also not significant.   
  Among alliance types, we find that product development type, joint marketing type, 
market access type, and other type of marketing alliance are all not significant. Only product 
integration is negative and significant (π5ijk = –.001, p < .05). Furthermore, for the changes in the 
firm’s systematic risk, the partner firm’s density has a significant and positive impact (βp7k = 
.009, p < .01); consistent with our hypothesis, higher levels of partner network density also have 
a significant and negative impact (βp8k = –.006, p < .05). Figure 2 presents the combination of 
these relationships. In light of our previous results, we find that a partner’s network density 
increases the extent to which systematic risk increases after an alliance announcement, but at a 
decreasing rate, eventually reversing this downside at higher levels. This finding provides 
support for H5. Ultimately, a firm will experience an increase in its systematic risk following a 
marketing alliance announcement, which is consistent with our theorizing; however, the extent of 
this increase doesn’t appear be determined by formation of the alliance itself (as argued by H2 
and H3b) but rather by the density of the partner’s network. 
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Figure 2 Impact of Network Density on Focal Firm’s Systematic Risk 
2.3.3 Interaction Models  
Table 3 contains the results of the two additional models that further investigate the role 
of alliance type in the change in firm risk given a marketing alliance announcement. Model 3 
explores the change in idiosyncratic risk and provides similar insights. First, the intercept is 
negative and significant (π0jk = –.025, p < .001), which conforms to the previous finding that, on 
average, a marketing alliance announcement reduces idiosyncratic risk. Second, our indicator for 
a repeat alliance is positive and significant (π3jk = .019, p < .01), indicating a diminished risk 
benefit of engaging with a preexisting partner. A significant increase in risk also occurs with 
increases in the alliance’s abnormal returns (π1jk = .041, p < .01) and the strength of the firm’s 
network (βp6k = .001, p < .01). Regarding the interaction of alliance types with the firm’s 
network density, a similar pattern results, albeit weaker than the general case in Model 1. 
Product-related alliances show a negative (though not quite strong) effect of density of change in 
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idiosyncratic risk (βp3k = –.008, n.s.), followed by an increase in risk at higher levels of network 
density (βp4k = .027, p < .05). Following the same pattern, market-related alliances have a 
negative and significant impact on risk for network density (βp3k = –.010, p < .05) but a positive 
(and, again, not strong) impact on risk at higher levels of density (βp4k = .016, n.s.). 
Model 4 extends this analysis to the interaction effect of alliance types and network 
density on the change in systematic risk given a marketing alliance announcement. The intercept 
is negative and significant (π0jk = –.014, p < .001), providing some support for arguments counter 
to H2 in that, on average, a marketing alliance announcement reduces systematic risk (after we 
control for the interactions). Again, our indicator for a repeat alliance is positive and significant 
(π3jk = .008, p < .01), countering the advantage gained by forming the alliance, and providing 
support for the notion that a novel connection is required to obtain a risk benefit from an alliance 
announcement. Even if these findings are contrary to our original diversification-based 
hypotheses, they support a brand-equity based view whereby engaging in cobranding alliances 
firms can gain brand equity and reduce their systematic risk (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). 
By building brand equity and stimulating loyalty, the firm creates a situation in which 
consumption of its products suffers less from downturns in the economy. This insulation from 
the broader markets translates into lower firm systematic risk. 
Similar to our previous findings, the partner firm’s network density has a inverse U-
shaped relationship to the change in systematic risk, first increasing at lower levels of density 
(βp7k = .026, p < .001) and then decreasing at higher levels (βp8k = –.021, p < .001). However, 
this pattern is inverse for product-related alliances in the interaction coefficients (β47k = –.021, p 
< .001; β48k = .020, p < .001, respectively), thus resulting in a net zero impact of partner firm 
network density on systematic risk for these alliances. 
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Table 3 Change in Firm Risk Following a Marketing Alliance Announcement: Network 
Interactions with Type of Marketing Alliance 
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 We provide no formal hypotheses for the differential impact of network density on 
changes to risk (idiosyncratic or systematic) across different alliance types, but Models 3 and 4 
are useful in two ways. First, they validate the general underlying pattern of results found in 
Models 1 and 2, and second, they provide evidence of a richer set of circumstances that affect 
marketing alliances’ effect on firm risk, offering opportunities for further research on the topic. 
2.3.4 Robustness Checks 
Longer risk calculation window: six months. To calculate our measures of idiosyncratic 
and systematic risks, we follow the work of Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) by examining 50 
trading days before and 50 trading days after the alliance announcement (from –60 days to –10 
days and then from +10 days to +60 days, around the announcement at day 0). These windows 
give us roughly two and a half months of data for each firm with which to calculate their risk 
exposure. To test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of this particular window, we 
expanded the firm observation period to six months before and six months after the alliance 
announcement. 
 The findings relative to the expected decrease in idiosyncratic and systematic risks, as 
well as the detrimental impact of repeat partnerships, remain unchanged. However, the 
coefficients related to network position become nonsignificant, with the exception of the 
partner’s network density, which remains positive and significant (βp7k = .017, p < .001). This 
loss of significance, combined with the loss of significance of the alliance’s abnormal returns 
and the increasing significance of both a firm’s credit rating and alliance type, leads us to 
conjecture that the increase in the risk window captures events beyond the singular alliance 
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announcement we measure. As such, the extended window models should be less reliable than 
those we presented previously.  
Alliance experience. Another possible moderating force for the impact of marketing 
alliance announcements on a firm’s idiosyncratic and systematic risk is the firm’s experience in 
forming alliances. While the inclusion of abnormal returns controls for any disproportionate 
gains from experienced firms, the amount of experience itself could be indicative of an 
underlying firm strategy.  
When we incorporate the firm’s experience into our models of change in risk exposure, 
we find that experience is a nonsignificant predictor of change in both idiosyncratic risk (βp10k = 
.000, n.s.) and systematic risk (βp10k = .000, n.s.). As such, we can conclude that a firm’s 
experience and the strategies it indicates have no effect on the impact of alliance on market risk 
exposure beyond that which accompanies any expected disproportionate returns from the 
alliance itself.  
Repeat alliances as a continuous measure. We use a dichotomous measure of repeat 
partnerships to capture structural change, but the entire concept of repeat partnerships is more 
complex. Essentially, the generation of zero values in repeat partnerships follows a different 
process than nonzero values. Firms must first decide whether to reenter a partnership and then 
determine how often to do so. With these two processes, the repeat concept taps into two distinct 
constructs: (1) structural, which pertains to the first decision of whether to reengage with a 
preexisting partner, as captured by the dichotomous measurement of “repeat,” and (2) relational, 
which captures the frequency with which the partners choose to cooperate, captured by a 
continuous treatment of “repeat.”  If we include this alternative (continuous) measure of 
repeat partnerships in our models of equity risk, the impact of repeated partnerships on 
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idiosyncratic risk is nonsignificant (π3jk = –.002, n.s.); however, repeated partnership has a 
negative and significant impact on systematic risk (π3jk = –.0015, p < .05). For our study, given 
our focus on explaining the impact of structural changes in the network, the dichotomized repeat 
measurement is more appropriate.  
2.4 DISCUSSION  
The results from this research show that the announcement of a marketing alliance is a 
significant event with implications for the firm’s risk. In contrast with prior research, we focus 
on the impact of marketing alliances on both idiosyncratic and systematic risk. By disentangling 
the impact of marketing alliances on these components of risk and by examining the impact of 
networks on marketing alliances, we shed new light on how and why marketing alliance 
formation influences firm risk. A basic argument underlying our study lies in the expectation that 
firms become more similar as they interconnect through alliances, which leads to non-stable 
correlations and necessitates network-level, rather than portfolio-level, analysis when examining 
the implications of a broad set of partners on a firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risks.  
Theoretical Contributions 
Our contributions to theory are fourfold. First, we advance understanding of the 
mechanisms by which marketing alliances change the volatility of a firm’s equity, thereby 
building on the initial work of Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998). We show that idiosyncratic risk 
decreases after a marketing alliance, which implies a reduction in volatility of cash flows, 
perhaps because of the diversification benefits marketing alliances afford. Indeed, most 
marketing alliances are formed to access either new markets (or customer segments) or new 
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products, both of which help reduce risk. More important, this result holds after we control for 
the magnitude of alliance returns; this suggests that the reduction in risk after a marketing 
alliance cannot be accounted for by the belief that marketing alliances are inherently less risky 
(and also linked to low returns). Instead, we find that even after controlling for variations due to 
the magnitude of returns, marketing alliances are heralded by the stock market as contributing 
significantly to reducing equity volatility. Therefore, in conjunction with previous research that 
shows increased returns after a marketing alliance announcement (e.g., Houston and Johnson 
2000; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009), we demonstrate that marketing actions can create 
value by helping control the volatility of a firm’s stock. These findings regarding the reduction in 
risk after marketing alliances are contrary to those by Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), who find 
that risk actually increases after a marketing alliance. One reason for this difference might be that 
in their examination of marketing alliances, they do not disentangle systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk components or explore conditions that can increase risk exposure (e.g., network position). 
Furthermore, we account for the previous level of risk for firms entering an alliance, which 
suggests a noteworthy path for further research regarding optimal alliance seeking and network-
building decisions of firms under different risk scenarios. Ultimately, our findings provide new 
insights into the role of marketing alliances in influencing the systematic and idiosyncratic 
components of firm risk.  
Second, this research also provides new insights into the role of repeat partnerships, thus 
extending previous research examining the impact of repeat partnerships on alliance returns. 
Previous research has highlighted advantages of repeat partnerships from the perspective of 
strengthening trust and thereby reducing transaction costs (Gulati 1995). However, repeat 
partnerships can also increase redundancies and reduce performance when technological 
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uncertainty is high(Goerzen 2007). We demonstrate how repeat alliancescan influence the risk 
facing a firm. A marketing alliance announcement seems to reduce idiosyncratic risk, but only if 
it is a new partnership. As might be expected, repeat partnerships do not change the 
diversification and brand equity benefits accruing to a firm after a marketing alliance and 
therefore have no significant impact on firm risk.  
Third, we find that the network of prior alliances in which a firm has engaged has 
implications for firm risk. In particular, network density, or the interconnectedness of a firm’s 
partners, can significantly influence the idiosyncratic and systematic risk benefits a firm can reap 
after a marketing alliance. At very high levels, network density can reduce flexibility (Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt 2000); the implication is that benefits to idiosyncratic risk due to 
marketing alliance formation are limited to settings in which a firm is not embedded in a densely 
interconnected network.  
Fourth, partner network density also has implications for systematic risk benefits 
accruing to a firm after marketing alliance announcements. Every strategic alliance connects a 
firm with the broader stock market and makes it vulnerable to shocks experienced by the 
economy as a whole. However, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical demonstration of the 
impact of a partner’s network density on the firm’s own risk. By connecting a firm with new 
sources of interconnectedness embedded in a partner’s network, alliance formation can become a 
double-edged sword. Specifically, while alliances can be instrumental in reducing risks, they can 
also expose a firm to various economywide shocks, which may render it unstable and more risky. 
Therefore, managers should carefully evaluate the risks and benefits associated with strategic 
alliance partners before embarking on alliances. More important, they should examine partners’ 
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own network density and its implications for the firm’s own risk before entering into strategic 
alliances.  
The results with regard to alliance type are informative, and add to the literature that has 
focused on returns from alliance types such as product development and co-marketing (e.g., 
Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Kalaignanam, Shankar and Varadarajan 2007). First, we find that 
the reduction in idiosyncratic risk holds for most marketing alliance types, except market access 
alliances. We argued previously about a potential increase in uncertainty when outsourcing 
marketing actions, which might help explain the positive impact of market access alliances on 
idiosyncratic risk. Second, we find that marketing alliances help reduce systematic risk, and this 
result is even greater for product integration alliances. It is possible that the combinations of 
complementary products made possible through product integration further protect a firm against 
broader macroeconomic forces. For example, integrated or bundled products might stimulate 
greater brand loyalty and act as an insurance against broader market forces. The models in which 
alliance type interacts with network density (own and partner’s) also generate important insights. 
Product development and integration alliances increase the nonlinear impact of own network 
density on idiosyncratic risk, likely because information redundancies and technological lock-ins 
that occur at high levels of density contribute to increases in idiosyncratic risk. Conversely, the 
benefits of network density in lowering idiosyncratic risk at lower levels of density are more 
likely in the case of joint marketing and market access alliances, perhaps because the 
diversification benefits afforded at lower levels of network density occur more when jointly 
marketing a product or accessing new markets. 
Taken together, the current findings call into question the risk-reduction benefits touted 
in extant literature (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003). 
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Our research demonstrates that though a firm may attain risk-reduction benefits after forming a 
marketing alliance, these benefits can be erased by the firm’s own and the partner’s network of 
alliances. In a “network economy,” strategic alliances can be beneficial in reducing the costs 
associated with internal development, but they can also foster greater uncertainty and expose a 
firm to greater economywide shocks, particularly under certain conditions. By spotlighting the 
role of network density (own and partner’s), this research goes beyond the findings of Das, Sen, 
and Sengupta (1998) to demonstrate how network characteristics moderate the risk benefits of 
marketing alliances.  
Managerial Implications 
Alliances are a necessary part of business, but their success rates continue to be low. For 
example, according to Lunnan and Haugland (2008), alliance termination rates hover around 
50%. Much of the discussion surrounding alliances has centered on their ability to strengthen 
competitive position, increase efficiency, or help a firm gain access to new resources. The 
current research sheds light on an overlooked benefit of marketing alliances—namely, their 
ability to minimize firm risk. On average, we show that marketing alliances reduce the amount of 
volatility of cash flows (i.e., lower idiosyncratic risk) and also protect a firm against broader 
shifts in the stock market (i.e., lower systematic risk, after we account for specific alliance type). 
Both benefits are increasingly important to managers, particularly in a network economy. Indeed, 
the collapse of the housing industry led to far-reaching impacts and almost brought down the 
financial sector. The Greek debt crisis further highlights the dangers of a network economy, in 
which many countries are tied together because of a unified currency; in such an economy, no 
firm or industry can exist in isolation. Thus, managers should increasingly focus on ways to 
minimize exposure to negative movements in the stock market while also finding ways to reduce 
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volatility of cash flows. This research highlights one approach that might be helpful in this 
regard—namely, marketing alliances. We demonstrate that by pooling marketing resources, 
firms in an average position in the marketplace can reduce their risk.  
However, there are some conditions in which reduction in risk cannot be obtained. 
According to this research, managers should carefully examine the density of their own network 
as well as their partner’s network before initiating a marketing alliance. If a firm’s own density is 
high, the expected reduction in firm risk after a marketing alliance may not occur. This suggests 
that managers must have an overall strategy to help them manage their entire portfolio of 
interfirm relationships. The risk implications of network density are significant, and managers 
should strategically manage the structural aspects of their network of strategic alliance partners 
to prevent increases in volatility of cash flows arising from the lack of diversification in the 
network. Furthermore, managers should examine the network density of their partner firms 
before entering into an alliance because partner network density at moderate levels may reduce 
the benefits of the alliance, particularly with regard to systematic risk.  
This does not mean that strategic construction and management of their local or broader 
network is possible for all firms; the ability to do so will vary from case to case. Large, powerful, 
and successful firms are likely to have a disproportionally larger number of possible partners, 
while smaller, less successful firms will have fewer choices and thus are more likely to accept 
their naturally occurring network position. However, a firm’s position will still provide a 
manager with information about the risk consequences of a marketing alliance, which in the case 
of a low-positioned firm constitutes the first step in generating mitigation strategies.  
Managers should also realize that when following a risk-minimizing strategy, they will 
face a trade-off between idiosyncratic and systematic risk. To reduce idiosyncratic risk, they 
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should seek novel connections; however, these new connections increase firms’ exposure to 
novel macroeconomic forces and increase systematic risk. Balancing this trade-off is important, 
and the optimal solution will vary depending on the firm’s situation at any point in time and its 
stakeholders. 
Last, our study focuses on equity risk (and observed firm risk based on long term cash 
flow volatility and credit risk; see Appendix B), but this is not the only way managers perceive 
or act on their preferences for risk. Both March and Shapira (1987, 1992) and Miller and Chen 
(2004) examine different conceptualizations of risk, mostly pertaining to downside consequences 
and the monetary value of potential losses. Although these perspectives can guide decision 
making, such as alliance seeking and partner selection, the risks we discuss herein also affect 
day-to-day operations through the firm’s ability to meet debt obligations, secure further funding, 
or increase its desirability and value in the financial market.  
The success of an alliance hinges on many factors, ranging from partner selection to 
alliance management. This research suggests that managers can benefit from marketing alliances 
by reducing volatility of cash flows. By ensuring that the right network conditions are present for 
risk reduction benefits to accrue or by understanding the consequences of their given position, 
managers will be in a better position to improve the outcomes from marketing alliances. 
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3.0  USING SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING DATA TO FORECAST ONLINE 
WORD OF MOUTH VALENCE: A NETWORK-BASED PERSPECTIVE 
Social media monitoring is a fast-growing and increasingly specialized area of marketing 
research. Firms use social media monitoring services to track brand and product mentions across 
various online social media sources, such as online social networking platforms exemplified by 
Facebook and Twitter, as well as blogs and online discussion forums. These services typically 
provide firms with two types of brand-level time series data: volume, which counts the number of 
times a given brand (or keyword, more generally) is mentioned in various social media sources, 
and valence, which quantifies the extent to which these brand mentions are positive or negative 
(i.e., sentiment). A large number of companies provide this service (e.g., Crimson Hexagon, 
Conversition, Cymphony, Nielsen, and Radian6), which firms see as valuable because it allows 
them to track consumer sentiment toward their brands and products. Compared to traditional 
marketing research methods for tracking brands over time (e.g., surveys), social media 
monitoring data has the advantage of being observational and unobtrusive, which makes it 
potentially more attractive from a research perspective, and also tends to be cheaper to collect.  
Similar to traditional brand tracking research, a standard use of social media monitoring 
data, particularly valence, is backward looking in the sense that managers use it to evaluate past 
performance. While this can provide useful insights, managers also want to predict the future and 
therefore seek forward-looking uses for social media monitoring data. For example, while it is 
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useful for a manager to know that over the last three months positive mentions of her brand 
decreased and negative mentions increased, it would be more useful for her to know in advance 
that over the next three months she can expect increasing negative and decreasing positive 
mentions. In other words, it would be useful if social media monitoring data could be used as an 
early-warning system to forecast, with reasonable accuracy, consumer sentiment as indicated by 
online word-of-mouth (WOM) valence. 
This paper shows how standard, commercially available, brand-level social media 
monitoring time-series data can be used to build reasonably accurate valence-forecasting models. 
Despite the increasing numbers of social media sources and social media monitoring services 
that extract data from those sources, the data these services collect is relatively standardized. A 
typical social media monitoring dataset for a single brand is a time series data that documents, by 
source (specific social media website), the number of positive and the number of negative 
mentions of that brand per time period.5 Because social media monitoring services typically 
provide time series data at regular intervals, these data can be used to build valence-forecasting 
models. Interestingly, however, although marketers often try to forecast other variables such as 
demand, market size, sales, and new product adoption, they typically do not apply forecasting 
methods to consumer attitudes or online WOM valence. Historically, this may have been due to a 
lack of frequently collected data. Social media monitoring valence data fortunately has the 
potential to overcome this problem.  
A challenge when forecasting consumer attitudes toward brands, irrespective of the data 
source used, is that brands typically do not exist alone neither in consumers’ minds nor in social 
media; i.e., brands are, to some degree, interdependent or related. Indeed, central to the concept 
                                                
5 Note that these data could be for a single brand or for a brand broken down into a set of relevant keywords. Total 
mentions (positive + negative + neutral) are also usually tracked. 
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of brand equity is the notion that the perceived value of a given brand is shaped by associations 
between it and competitive alternatives (Keller 1993). Consumers’ perceptions of brands are 
likely to be formed in a relative, not absolute, sense. This is consistent with the notion that 
consumers store information (including brand-related information) in cognitive associative 
networks, where the “nodes” in these networks contain information (e.g. brands) and the links 
contain associative information between the nodes (e.g., similar brands; Krishnan 1996). It is 
therefore not surprising that prior research emphasizes the importance of understanding how 
brands are related to other brands (Henderson, Iacobucci, and Calder 1998), and argues that 
inter-brand associations can be represented as networks and modeled using methods from the 
network analysis literature (Henderson, Iacobucci, and Calder 2002).  
This implies that a reasonably accurate valence-forecasting model for a single brand will 
need to incorporate information from other brands, or at least take into account associative 
relations between brands in the same industry or product category. Although this could be done 
using traditional marketing research data (e.g., tracking surveys), it is likely to be expensive 
because it would require firms to collect time-series data for many brands instead of just for their 
own brand and possibly a limited number of competitors. The cost of multi-brand, time-series 
valence data from social media sources is typically substantially lower, which makes it 
potentially viable from a forecasting perspective. 
We propose a method for building valence-forecasting models that account for 
associative relations between brands in order to get better forecasts of positive and negative 
brand mentions in social media. Our method leverages standard, commercially available social 
media monitoring data to represent a brand’s associations with other brands as a time-varying 
network where brands are nodes and ties exist between pairs of brands if they are mentioned 
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together in the same time period in the same source or sources (e.g., social networking sites, 
blogs, forums).6 We then use these networks to compute time-varying brand-level “network” 
metrics that are used in models as predictors of future positive and negative valence. We show 
that the inclusion of these predictors—which incorporate information on inter-brand 
associations—improves the accuracy of valence forecasts.  
This research makes two main contributions to the literature on social media marketing 
and marketing research methodology more broadly. First, we show how social media monitoring 
data—which is affordable and widely available—can be used for a forward-looking manner to 
calibrate valence-forecasting models. This can help managers anticipate changes in positive and 
negative social-media brand mentions and allows them to build early-warning systems as part of 
their social media monitoring activities. Further, it helps to extract additional insights from what 
has now become a common, but under-utilized, type of marketing research data. Second, we 
show that incorporating information on brands’ associations with each other (inferred from social 
media monitoring data) into forecasting models has value because it reduces forecast error. By 
taking into account the fact that brands do not exist in a vacuum and that consumer attitudes 
toward brands tend to be relative and comparative we show that our ability to forecast valence of 
social media mentions can be improved. 
 
                                                
6 Although this is an imperfect proxy for brand relatedness or “connections,” we show that it is sufficient in that 
including this information significantly reduces forecast error in our empirical application. 
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3.1 BACKGROUND 
Prior research has examined the implications of online WOM and brand mentions in 
social media channels with respect to both volume (i.e., number of mentions) and valence (i.e., 
sentiment or positivity/negativity of mentions). This stream of research has examined the 
dynamics of online WOM and how it impacts marketing outcomes such as sales and new product 
adoption (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2004, 2009; Liu 2006; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Trusov, 
Bucklin and Pauwels 2009; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011; Stephen and Galak 2012; 
Moe and Trusov 2011). Related research has also attempted to link online brand/firm mentions 
to stock market performance (e.g., Luo 2007, 2009; Tirunillai and Tellis 2011; McAlister, 
Sonnier and Shively 2012).  
Extant studies have generally shown that online WOM affects marketing performance. 
Godes and Mayzlin (2004) link discussions of new TV shows to TV show ratings. Chevalier and 
Mayzlin (2006) examine online book reviews with respect to volume and valence and find that 
valence has a significant impact on retail sales, with negative valence having a stronger effect 
than positive valence. Liu (2006) studies movie box office revenues and finds that online review 
volume, as opposed to valence, drives revenues. Also in the movie context, more recent work by 
Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman (2010) has found that valence is also a key driver of 
box office revenues. Finally, in a meta-analysis, de Matos and Rossi (2008) find that WOM 
valence is associated with consumer loyalty and satisfaction. Clearly, the valence of brand 
mentions in social media is important since it has been repeatedly shown to be a key predictor of 
important marketing performance outcomes. However, while the literature has used online 
sentiment to forecast future buying behavior, sales (Sonnier, McAlister, and Rutz 2011), and the 
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stock market performance of firms (Tirunillai and Tellis 2012), to the best of our knowledge no 
prior studies have focused on forecasting the valence of online WOM itself.  
With respect to using social media data or online WOM data to derive marketing insights, 
in addition to linking WOM to product consumption (TV show ratings), Godes and Mayzlin 
(2004) also introduced the concept of entropy, which is a measure of how concentrated or 
dispersed the “conversation” about a brand is across sources. In their case, Godes and Mayzlin 
(2004) captured the extent to which conversations about new TV shows were concentrated in a 
one or a few online discussion rooms or dispersed over many. In our case, we apply this concept 
to whether a brand’s mentions in a given time period are concentrated in a few sources (e.g., just 
on a particular Facebook page) or dispersed over many sources (e.g., Facebook, multiple 
discussion boards, blogs, and Twitter). We do this because prior work has demonstrated the 
importance of accounting for entropy in a multi-source online WOM context. 
Finally, we note that literature on extracting associations between brands from social 
media-type data—which is a key step of our method—is scant. A notable exception is Netzer et 
al. (2012), who used data from an online discussion forum and subjected it to text-mining 
algorithms that allowed them to build associative inter-brand networks. They used these 
networks to show how this method could be used to infer market structure. Similar to their 
approach, we use social media data to construct associative networks for brands. However, our 
research extends Netzer et al. (2012) in at least two ways. First, we build time-varying brand 
networks using co-occurrences of brands across a large number of social media sources. Second, 
our primary purpose lies not in showing how such networks can be inferred, but rather how 
future brand valence can be reliably forecast using such information. Importantly, our approach 
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shows how marketing research insights can be improved (i.e., more accurate forecasts) without 
increasing firms’ data requirements. 
3.2 DATA AND METHOD 
3.2.1 Social Media Monitoring Data 
Valence data. We use commercially available social media monitoring data from 
Nielsen’s BuzzMetrics service. The dataset covered 77 consumer electronics and technology 
brands over 16-months from November 2009 to February 2011. Examples of brands included in 
the dataset are Amazon, Apple, Motorola, and Sony. Nielsen provided, for each brand, monthly 
counts of positive and negative brand mentions. Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics. We 
focus on the number of positive messages and the number of negative messages as the indicators 
of brand valence that we attempt to forecast. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Monthly Positive, Negative, and Neutral Comments 
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Nielsen BuzzMetrics uses proprietary algorithms that mine a large number of social 
media sources, from online social networks to blogs to discussion forums, and identify brand-
related posts or mentions. They then analyze the text using natural language processing and 
sentiment analysis algorithms to identify which posts/mentions are predominantly positive, 
which are predominantly negative, and which are neutral (everything else that is not positive or 
negative). Thus, the raw dataset provides monthly counts of positive and negative mentions by 
social-media source for each brand. We did not perform sentiment analysis ourselves to 
determine the valence of the brand mentions, and instead relied on the commercial dataset from 
Nielsen (as a manager would do). This is appropriate since this paper focuses on using data that 
managers can readily access to forecast valence, and not on validating the computer science and 
machine learning methods used to extract valence from social media monitoring data. 
Social-media source data. In addition to the cross-sectional time-series data counting 
positive and negative mentions of brands, Nielsen provided data on the sources of the brand 
mentions in social media. For each month and each brand we knew how many times it was 
mentioned across 7,376 unique sources. In this context a source is a specific social media site 
(indicated by a URL), such as a social networking site, a blog, or a discussion forum. The 
sources represented in the data range from relatively unknown blogs and forums to well-known 
destinations such as mashable.com, endgadget.com, facebook.com, and twitter.com. At the 
source level, there was large variance in monthly brand mentions, ranging from zero mentions to 
122,948 mentions.  
An important caveat of the source data, however, is that it does not break the brand 
mentions down by valence within each source. Thus, while we know, for each brand and each 
month, the numbers of positive and negative mentions aggregated across all sources and 
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numbers of mentions irrespective of valence for each source, we do not have brand-source-level 
valence data. We use the source-level volume (but not valence) data to construct time-varying 
networks that describe how brands are related or similar to each other based on being mentioned 
in the same sources at the same time. Although this is not perfect, our network-construction 
method based on the unvalenced source data still yields improvements in our valence forecasts. 
 
3.2.2 Brand Network Data from Source Data 
The source data counting brand mentions by source type by month can be thought of as 
affiliation data that shows how each brand is affiliated with each source in each month. In this 
context, a brand is affiliated with a source if that brand is mentioned in that source at least once. 
Affiliation data can be represented mathematically by affiliation matrices, and are often used to 
summarize bipartite graphs, otherwise known as two-mode networks (Harary 1969). In our 
context, for period t we define an N-by-M affiliation matrix At to represent the affiliations 
between N brands and M sources. Element aikt ≥ 0 is the number of times in period t that brand i 
is mentioned in source k (for i = 1 to N and k = 1 to M).  
As mentioned earlier we need to infer “connections” or associations between brands, not 
between brands and sources. A measure of inter-brand association must capture the extent to 
which online WOM overlaps across sources for each pair of brands. Following Borgatti and 
Halgin (2011), representing this type of association as a network tie can be justified from two 
perspectives. First, a brand-pair coexisting in a similar space of online discussion or conversation 
provides an opportunity for these brands to be compared in the minds of consumers. Second, a 
brand-pair coexisting in a similar space of online discussion or conversation occurs due to some 
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unobservable underlying relationship between the brands or unobservable characteristics that the 
brands have in common, which manifests in where and when consumers choose to discuss them 
online in social media. 
To represent inter-brand associations in a network form we must convert the brand-by-
source affiliation matrices At to brand-to-brand association matrices. A number of possible 
approaches could be used to determine the extent of association based on contemporaneous 
overlapping brand mentions across social-media sources. Two straightforward possibilities are to 
count the number of sources where both brands appear in the same period, or to normalize this 
count by dividing it by the total number of sources. A third possibility is to compute the Jaccard 
coefficient for each brand-pair in each period, which would be the total number of shared sources 
divided by the total number of sources where at least one of the brands in the pair appears. A 
fourth possibility is the Bonacich normalization, which calculates the extent to which the overlap 
exceeds an expected amount of overlap given the number of sources where each brand is present. 
A disadvantage of each of these four possible approaches is that they result in lost information 
when the brand-by-source affiliation matrix is converted to a brand-by-brand association matrix, 
since each method accounts for only those sources where the brands were present, but ignores 
the potential information available in the not-present space, where brands were not discussed 
even though they had the opportunity. Put simply, there may be information in two brands not 
appearing the same sources at the same time, just as there is likely information in two brands 
appearing together at the same time. 
A fifth possibility—which we use—addresses this limitation of the other four approaches, 
preserves information, and is more straightforward because it is based on Pearson correlation 
coefficients. We convert each brand-by-source affiliation matrix At to a corresponding brand-by-
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brand (N-by-N) association matrix Bt that can then be analyzed using familiar network analysis 
methods. Off-diagonal element bijt in Bt (for i ≠ j, and bijt = bjit) is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient computed across all M sources for brand i and j in period t; i.e.,  
bijt =
aikt − ait( ) ajkt − ajt( )
k=1
M
∑
aikt − ait( )
2
k=1
M
∑ ajkt − ajt( )
2
k=1
M
∑
 
Where ait = 1M aiktk=1
M
∑ , the mean number of mentions per source for brand i in period t. A 
higher correlation (bijt) between a pair of brands means a higher degree of association between 
them in that period because of a greater extent of overlapping mentions (or non-mentions) across 
sources. This accounts for being mentioned or not mentioned in the same sources at the same 
time and the volume of mentions. Importantly, this takes into account instances where a brand-
pair is jointly absent, which is not fully taken into account by the other methods we considered.  
For subsequent network analysis we followed standard network analysis procedures by 
transforming each Bt such that diagonal elements were zero and off-diagonal elements (measures 
of brand association strength) were dichotomized to be 1 for bijt > .70 and 0 otherwise. The 
squared Pearson correlation coefficient of .70, gives us a coefficient of determination of .49, 
meaning that to be “connected” in our dichotomized association matrix, roughly 50% of the 
variability in one brand’s social media presence is explained by the variability in the other brand 
in the pair, which can be viewed as a better-than-chance likelihood of a meaningful inter-brand 
association. This value of Pearson correlation coefficient provides a more conservative network 
dichotomization, and a more sparse network structure, to the common methodology used by 
default in standard network analysis software, where a meaningful association is assumed to 
exists if bijt > 0. 
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Our brand association network does not necessarily imply that a brand-pair are mentioned 
in precisely the same post (e.g., where a consumer compares a Sony TV to a similar Samsung 
TV). Rather, it simply indicates that a pair of brands was mentioned in the same place at 
approximately the same time (i.e., in the same discrete time period). We acknowledge that this is 
not a perfect measure of association between brands, however, as we show later, incorporating 
this information into forecasting models is enough to significantly reduce forecast error. Further, 
this is the best that can be done with standard social media monitoring data provided by 
companies like Nielsen and without more thorough text mining analysis (cf. Netzer et al. 2012). 
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Variables Used In The Forecasting Models 
We now list and define each of the variables used in our forecasting models. We report 
descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients in Table 5. 
Positive messages (valence). The number of positive messages mentioning each brand 
per month. We use this as a dependent variable. 
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Negative messages (valence). The number of negative messages mentioning each brand 
per month. We use this as a dependent variable. 
Lagged valence. We use one-period lagged positive and negative messages mentioning 
each brand as control variables in our models.  
Lagged volume. We use the one-period lagged total number of messages mentioning 
each brand (positive + negative + neutral) as a control variable in our models. This controls for 
the total amount of online WOM for each brand.  
Entropy. This variable follows the measure of entropy introduced for online WOM 
modeling by Godes and Mayzlin (2004, p.551). It captures the extent to which mentions of a 
brand in a month are concentrated in a small number of sources or equally dispersed over a large 
number of sources. If all of the mentions are in from a single source in a month, then entropy = 
0. Entropy increases, and approaches entropy = 1 as the number of sources with mentions 
increases and the overall volume of mentions becomes evenly distributed across all sources.   
Degree centrality. This is computed from the dichotomized brand network in each time 
period and is the number of other brands a brand is directly associated with (“connected” to) in a 
given month in the network. For example, if brand i in month t is associated directly with four 
other brands then degreeit = 4. 
Clustering coefficient. This is also computed from the dichotomized brand network in 
each time period and is another standard node-level social network metric. In a social network, a 
person’s clustering coefficient is the proportion of her friends that are also friends with each 
other (Watts and Strogatz 1998). In our context, clustering is a measure of the interconnectedness 
of the other brands that brand i is associated with in month t. Clustering ranges between 0 and 1, 
with higher values indicating that a brand is part of a denser local network or tightly 
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interconnected cluster of brands. We compute brand i’s clustering coefficient on the month t 
network as the total number of links between the brands that brand i is connected to divided by 
the total number of such possible links. 
Owned media. This is a control variable that measures the percentage of a brand’s posts 
that come from brand-owned websites (i.e., “owned” media; Stephen and Galak 2012).  
Brand extension. This is a dummy variable that controls for the fact that some of the 
brands in our sample were new products introduced as brand extensions during the observation 
window (1), whereas others were established brands (0).  
Seasonality. Consistent with standard practice in time series modeling, we control for 
seasonality with two dummy variables, one indicating the month of December, and another 
indicating the (northern hemisphere) summer months of July and August. Similar to Trusov et al. 
(2009), we find that these periods correspond with certain holidays (e.g. Christmas), and periods 
(e.g. summer) with online activity that is inconsistent with the remainder of the calendar year. 
Time trend. Finally, we included a time trend variable to captures any systematic 
variation due to time in the 16-month timeframe of our sample, consistent with standard practice 
in time series modeling.  
3.3 FORECASTING MODELS 
Model Considerations 
We now develop a forecasting model that accounts for a number of characteristics 
specific to our dataset and are therefore likely to be present in many commercial social media 
monitoring datasets that in essence are multi-brand, multi-period dynamic panel datasets.  
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First, we account for brand-level unobserved heterogeneity in our panel dataset since we 
have multiple observations for each brand. We use a straightforward random-intercept 
specification with brand random effects. An alternative would be brand fixed effects, however 
with 77 brands it is unlikely to be as efficient as the random effects specification. In any case, we 
checked both random- and fixed-effects specifications for each of our models and confirmed that 
the random-effects specification is preferred in all cases with Hausman tests. 
Second, the forecasted (dependent) variables of positive and negative valence are counts 
of the numbers of posts of each valence, and these vary over time. Thus, they are time series 
count variables. As a first step we must determine whether each is a stationary or evolving time 
series, consistent with standard practice in multivariate time series modeling. If these variables 
are stationary then they should be modeled as counts (i.e., non-negative integers), however if 
these variables are evolving then should be transformed (first-differenced) and will then have 
different distributional properties. Based on an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for panel 
data using a variety of lags for robustness (0-, 1-, and 2-period lags) it appears that both positive 
valence and negative valence are stationary (ps < .001).  
Third, given that the dependent variables are stationary they should be modeled as 
counts. Two typical distributions used to model count data are Poisson (assuming equidispersion; 
i.e., mean = variance) and negative binomial (allowing for overdispersion; i.e., mean ≤ variance). 
Based on unconditional means and variances for these two variables it appears that they are 
overdispersed. This suggests that a negative binomial model will be more appropriate, however 
we tested both random-effects Poisson and random-effects negative binomial models.  
Fourth, there may be an excess number of observations where the dependent variables 
equal zero, which would necessitate using a zero-inflated model. We estimated regular and zero-
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inflated random-effects Poisson and negative binomial models. Vuong tests suggested that a 
zero-inflated random-effects Poisson model is preferable to a regular random-effects Poisson 
model (Z = 4.51, p < .001). However, a regular random-effects negative binomial model is 
preferable to a zero-inflated version (Z = -3.68, p < .001).7 Based on these comparisons, we use a 
random-effects negative binomial model (without zero-inflation) since it allows us to handle 
overdispersion without added model complexity due to zero-inflation. 
Fifth, we need to account for potential endogeneity. This is particularly likely for the two 
network-based variables—degree and clustering—since network variables are often endogenous 
in prior research. This could be due to, for example, more positively or negatively discussed 
brands attracting additional online WOM that compares them to other brands, which would 
affect a brand’s network position (degree and clustering). We checked all the non-dependent 
variables with Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) and found that 
degree, clustering, and entropy are endogenous. To address this we follow an approach suggested 
by Wooldridge (2002) for dealing with endogeneity in exponential-family generalized linear 
models (such as the Poisson and negative binomial models used here). The approach is a 
straightforward two-stage procedure, which we describe below. 
  
3.3.1 Model Specification and Evaluation  
Based on these considerations, our model is a two-stage dynamic panel model with a 
random-effects negative binomial regression. In simple terms, our model regresses the number of 
                                                
7 For these Vuong tests, a positive (negative) test statistic indicates that a zero-inflated model is preferable (not 
preferable). 
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positive (or negative) mentions of a brand in the current period on a series of lagged predictors 
and control variables (e.g., time-invariant brand characteristics as fixed effects). Importantly, 
since we are interested in forecasting a brand’s online WOM valence, we consider how a brand’s 
prior-period valence, WOM volume, and network position affect current-period valence. 
Specifically, for the random-effects negative binomial model, let yit be the number of 
positive (or negative) mentions of brand i in month t and has the following probability 
distribution function:   
P(yit ) =
φ
φ +λ
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#
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Where λ is the mean and the variance is λ + λ2/ϕ, and ϕ is the dispersion parameter. We 
use a generalized linear model to model the conditional mean of yit as a function of 
predictors/covariates Xit and such that log λ = αi + Xit β. We use gamma random effects (αi). 
Since some of our covariates are endogenous (degree, clustering, entropy), we partition Xit into 
exogenous (Wit) and endogenous (Zit) components.  
As mentioned above, we use a two-stage method described by Wooldridge (2002) for 
handling endogeneity. In the first-stage regression we use a random-effects Gaussian model to 
regress Zit on Wit, and recover the residuals δit. In the second-stage regression we use the 
random-effects negative binomial model to regress either positive or negative mention counts 
(yit) on Wit, Zit, and δit—the exogenous predictors, endogenous predictors, and residuals from the 
first-stage regressions. In both stages we use maximum likelihood estimation. 
We consider three nested model specifications. Model 1 (base) predicts current positive 
or negative valence using lagged valence and volume as predictors, and controlling for brand 
characteristics with fixed effects. Additionally, we include as an additional control variable the 
other current-period valence variable (e.g., for the regression with positive valence as the 
 64 
dependent variable this control variable is negative valence). We include this as a control 
variable since the counts of same-period positive and negative valence are highly correlated (r = 
.72; see Table 5). Model 2 (base + entropy) adds as an additional predictor, following Godes and 
Mayzlin (2004), lagged entropy as a measure of how concentrated or dispersed the conversation 
across sources. Finally, model 3 (base + entropy + network) adds as additional predictors a 
brand’s lagged degree and clustering (as well as their interaction). We include the degree x 
clustering interaction to account for the difficulty in increasing the clustering coefficient at high 
levels of degree centrality.8 Note that in Models 2 and 3 the entropy, degree, and clustering 
variables used are after having controlled for their endogeneity using the two-step procedure 
described above. 
To evaluate model performance we first examine model fit using likelihood-based 
metrics (-2 log-likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion [AIC], and Bayesian Information 
Criterion [BIC]). We then examine forecasting performance using adjusted Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error (MAPE). Unadjusted MAPE is computed as: 
MAPE = 1T
Ot −Ft
Ott=1
T
∑  
Where Ot is the actual, observed value in period t, and Ft is the forecasted value from the 
model for period t, and there are T periods in total. This is infeasible here (as is often the case) 
because we observe Ot = 0. Following Voronin and Partanen (2012), we instead use adjusted 
MAPE where Ot is replaced by the three-period moving average value of Ot. This eliminates the 
division-by-zero problem, except in the case of three consecutive periods of zero values, which 
we never observed. 
                                                
8 We thank David Krackhardt for this suggestion. 
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3.4 RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the results of the first-stage regressions (used when applicable), and 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the second-stage regressions for positive and negative 
WOM for all three nested models. In this section we briefly discuss the estimated effects 
(focusing on the main, second-stage model), although our primary interest lies in model 
comparisons and forecasting performance, which we subsequently discuss. 
 
Table 6 First-Stage Models 
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Table 7 Second-Stage Models: Positive Valence 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Positive Valence 
Model 1 in Table 7 is our baseline positive-valence model. This forecasts the number of 
positive brand mentions per month based on prior-month positive mentions, same- and prior-
month negative mentions, prior-month total WOM volume, and controls for seasonality, time, 
and time-invariant brand characteristics. We find that over time we can expect a brand to be 
mentioned positively more times (b = .0392, p < .001), and that positive mentions increase 
during summer (b = .2415, p < .01). Brand extensions on average have fewer positive mentions 
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(b = -1.0973, p < .001), and positive mentions increase as the percentage of messages from a 
brand’s owned media increases (b = 1.7029, p < .001). Not surprisingly, the first-order 
autoregressive effect (i.e., prior-month positive mentions) is significant and positive (b = .0001, 
p < .001). In other words, prior-month positive valence predicts next-month positive valence. 
Prior-month negative valence has the opposite effect (b = -.0001, p < .001), while same-month 
negative valence has a small positive effect (b = .0001, p < .001). These effects stay relatively 
consistent as we build more complex models on top of this baseline specification. 
 Model 2 in Table 7 adds entropy (and uses the two-stage estimator described 
above since entropy is endogenous). Entropy has a positive effect on positive valence (b = .9484, 
p < .001). As the social-media-based conversation about a brand becomes more dispersed across 
sources, we can expect there to be more positive mentions of the brand in the next month. This 
model fits better than Model 1 based on AIC and BIC. 
 Model 3 in Table 7 adds the brand-association network position measures—
degree and clustering to Model 2 (and again uses the two-stage estimator). Degree and clustering 
are significant predictors of positive valence. Degree has a negative impact on next month’s 
positive mentions (b = -.2629, p < .001), while clustering has a positive impact (b = .0246, p < 
.001). This model fits better than Models 1 and 2 based on AIC and BIC. 
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Table 8 Second-Stage Models: Negative Valence 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Negative Valence 
Model 1 in Table 8 is the baseline negative-valence model with a parallel specification to 
positive-valence Model 1 in Table 7. We observe a similar pattern of results. We can expect 
more negative mentions over time (b = .0364, p < .001), and these increase during the summer 
months (b = .2881, p < .001), but decrease in December (b = -.2164, p < .01). Brand extensions 
can expect fewer negative mentions (b = -1.0568, p < .001), but once again, more as the 
percentage of mentions from the brand’s owned media increases (b = 1.5124, p < .001). The 
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number of prior-month positive mentions has no impact on the number of negative messages in 
the next month (b = .000, n.s.). Prior-month negative valence has a marginally significant 
negative effect (b = -.0001, p < .10). Lastly, there is a positive effect of same-month positive 
mentions on negative valence (b = .0001, p < .001). 
Model 2 in Table 8 adds entropy to Model 1 and uses the two-stage estimator. Entropy 
has a significant positive effect on next-month negative valence (b = .8047, p < .001). Thus, as 
the conversation becomes more dispersed across sources, then the brand can also expect more 
negative messages. This model fits better than Model 1 based on AIC and BIC. 
Model 3 in Table 8 adds the two network position variables to Model 2 and uses the two-
stage estimator. Degree has a negative effect on next-period negative valence (b = -.1907, p < 
.001), while clustering has a positive effect (b = .0294, p < .001). The degree x clustering 
interaction is negative but marginally significant (b = -.0007, p < .10). This model fits better than 
Models 1 and 2 based on AIC and BIC. 
 
3.4.3 In- and Out-of-Sample Fit 
In Table 9 we report adjusted MAPE for the three positive and the three negative valence 
models. For in-sample fit we estimated each model using all 77 brands and all 16 months. We 
then compared predicted to observed values by computing adjusted MAPEs. Consistent with the 
likelihood-based model fit indices reported in Tables 7 and 8, for both positive and negative 
valence we found that Model 3 had the lowest error and thus the best in-sample predictive fit. 
For out-of-sample fit we randomly allocated each of the 77 brands into either an estimation set 
(39 brands) or a holdout set (38 brands). We estimated each model using observations from all 
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months on the brands in the estimation set, and then used these parameter estimates to compute 
predicted positive and negative valence counts for the brands in the holdout set. We compared 
the holdout-brands’ predicted values to observed values to compute adjusted MAPEs. For both 
positive and negative valence Model 3 had the lowest error and thus the best out-of-sample fit. 
Based on predictive and likelihood-based fit indices, Model 3—which includes the brand 
association network predictor variables—is the superior model. 
 
Table 9 In- and Out-of-Sample Fit: Adjusted Mean Absolute Percentage Errors 
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Table 10 Forecasting Results: Adjusted Mean Absolute Percentage Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.4 Forecasting 
We now consider our primary objective of testing how well our models perform when 
forecasting future numbers of positive and negative social-media brand mentions. Table 7 reports 
forecasting results (adjusted MAPEs) for positive and negative valence and each of the three 
model specifications. To compute these measures we estimated our models using all 77 brands 
over a reduced number of time periods and then used the estimates to compute predicted values 
for the future holdout time periods. Specifically, we estimated the models on K periods (where K 
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was less than the full number of periods available for estimation9), with K = {10, 11, 12, 13}. In 
other words, we varied the length of the estimation time window between 10 and 13 periods and 
therefore tested our ability to forecast between one and four months ahead. Our goal was to see 
how robust our models—particularly Model 3 including network predictors—were in shorter- 
and longer-range social-media valence forecasting.  
In addition to comparing our three model specifications, we added a fourth model 
specification (naïve) in which the expected future values (yit+1) were equal to the current period’s 
observed values (yit). While such models have long been a common and adequate benchmark for 
forecasting models (Granger and Newbold 1974), the naïve model also resembles what is often 
seen in practice whereby managers assume that prior valence is a decent predictor of future 
valence in the absence of any exogenous shocks or events (e.g., marketing campaigns). Although 
we never expect the naïve model to provide reliable forecasts, including it allows us to highlight 
the extent to which our proposed approach improves on current managerial practice.  
The results in Table 7 can be interpreted in two ways. First, we consider, for each number 
of months forecast, which model performs best from a forecasting perspective (i.e., in Table 7 
comparing across columns within each row). For all forecasting ranges (1 to 4 months) and for 
both positive and negative valences we see that Model 3, which incorporates the network 
predictors, performs the best. On average (across forecasting ranges), for positive valence, we 
see improvements in adjusted MAPEs between Model 3 and the naïve model, Model 1, and 
Model 2 of, respectively, 29.73%, 18.52%, and 17.97%. In the case of negative valence, the 
average improvements in adjusted MAPEs between Model 3 and the naïve model, Model 1, and 
Model 2 are, respectively, 84.93%, 26.61%, and 15.26%. Given our focus on using inferred 
                                                
9 The full number of available estimation periods was 14 months. This is because the first two months in the 16-
month dataset were used for lags. 
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inter-brand associations to help forecast valence (i.e., Model 3), we see that, irrespective of the 
valence of a brands’ mentions in social media, adding this information substantially increases 
forecast accuracy. Specifically, compared to the next-best model (Model 2), we see reductions in 
forecast error in the 15-20% range. This is impressive given that going from Model 2 to Model 3 
only entailed including two brand network position variables (and their interaction), which came 
from a relatively straightforward procedure using the source data. 
The second approach to interpreting the adjusted MAPE forecasting results in Table 7 is 
to see how robust a given model is to changes in the length of the forecasting range (i.e., in Table 
7 comparing across rows within each column). For Models 1 through 3 we see that forecast error 
decreases as the forecasting range is increased from one month to four months, albeit only 
slightly. For positive valence Model 3, increasing the forecasting range from 1 month to 4 
months reduces error by 3.63%, and by 7.86% in the case of negative valence Model 3. The fact 
that forecast error does not increase as the forecasting window increases (and the estimation 
window commensurably decreases) suggests that our models are robust for forecasting future 
values, at least within a few months into the future. Up to four months is likely sufficient from a 
managerial perspective in the context of social media marketing planning. Lastly, for the naïve 
model we notice that the forecast error increases as the forecasting range increases. This is 
because the naïve model simply uses prior valence to predict future valence and forecast errors 
carry through from period to period. This would not be expected if a brand’s WOM valence in 
social media was stable, however, at least for the sample of brands used in our analysis, this is 
apparently not the case. The poorer performance of this naïve benchmark as forecasting ranges 
increase also underscores the importance of using sophisticated forecasting. 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we proposed and empirically validated a relatively straightforward method 
for using brand-level, social media monitoring time-series data that extends what managers have 
typically been doing with this relatively new source of data. As we mentioned earlier, social 
media monitoring is often used only for backward-looking “listening” purposes. Or, if managers 
do use it for forward-looking purposes such as forecasting future “buzz” (or valence of that 
buzz), their models tend to be naïve or do not account for interdependence and associations 
between brands in a common product category or industry. Our findings show that accounting 
for these types of “connections” or “linkages” between brands can substantially improve 
forecasting ability with respect to social-media WOM valence, even if the inter-brand 
associations are inferred using relatively simple methods. Overall, our findings show that it is 
possible to build reasonably reliable models for managers to use to forecast positive and negative 
brand social-media-mentions and that the accuracy of these models improves when inter-brand 
associations is accounted for. 
Our focus has been on the valence of WOM about brands in social media and not the 
volume (total count) of those mentions. As we discussed above, extant research suggests that 
WOM valence is often a more important predictor of consumers’ actions (e.g., purchasing) than 
WOM volume. Managers also likely care more about forecasting valence than volume since how 
they react to expected changes in positive valence and negative valence is likely to be different. 
Further, valence is important in the social media monitoring context because it gives managers 
insights into consumers’ attitudes toward brands, as expressed by consumers’ opinions in social 
media posts. Since consumers’ opinions are unlikely to be generated in a vacuum and instead are 
relative to other brands and products, considering how brands are in some way connected to each 
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other is therefore also important. Although not the focus of the current research and best left for 
more detailed investigation in future research, this is possibly one reason why Model 3, which 
included the network predictors, outperformed the other models. 
The current study is not without limitations. First, since we do not have data on the text 
of consumers’ brand-related posts in social media sources we cannot validate the valence data 
provided to us by Nielsen. However, Nielsen is one of the world’s leading sources of social 
media monitoring data and a market leader in this industry, which gives us confidence in the 
validity of their data.  
Second, we were only able to examine the valence of the posts and not other potentially 
interesting variables. As natural language processing and sentiment analysis methods become 
more sophisticated it is becoming possible not only to quantify positive and negative mentions of 
brands, but also to capture more specific variables such as mentions by underlying topic or 
theme, or mentions by specific type of emotion (e.g., happiness-related mentions, anger-related 
mentions). This could be interesting for managers to forecast to see, for example, whether 
aspects of their brand positioning are picked up consistently over time in social media posts. For 
example, Coca-Cola is positioned around the emotional theme of happiness. It would be 
interesting for Coca-Cola to know if social media mentions of their brand are not only positive 
but also related to happiness. We expect that our method for forecasting WOM valence could be 
applied to forecasting other types of social media mentions given the appropriate data. 
Third, our study examined a single general product category (consumer electronics and 
technology). Since our focus was on proposing and testing a method and not testing a specific 
theory, we feel that the generalizability of the current research is less of a concern. Nevertheless, 
it would be interesting to test our method on other product categories, and we encourage others 
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to do so. We selected the consumer electronics industry since it is a broad category with general 
appeal. In the U.S. in 2012 consumer electronics was worth approximately $91 billion as an 
industry (Research and Markets Report 2012). Of course, a caveat is that our method is possibly 
most applicable to product categories that have more general appeal and are talked about in 
social media more commonly and frequently. 
Finally, while our method for using source information to identify which brand-pairs are 
associated with each other is straightforward, it is not perfect. As we mentioned earlier, inferring 
that two brands are associated with each other does not imply that they are closely related 
because they were mentioned jointly in social media posts at the same time and in the same 
place. Unlike Netzer et al. (2012), who used online forum post data and text mining methods, we 
could not identify whether brands were mentioned jointly or just in the same sources in the same 
month. Thus, our network is an imperfect estimate of the true underlying associative connections 
between brands. Nevertheless, we showed that even when these inferences are imperfect they 
still improve forecast accuracy. We expect that if we used brand networks based on finer-grained 
co-mentions (e.g., with full-text data for each post) our forecasts would further improve. Thus, 
while this is a limitation of the current work, it suggests that our results may be a lower-bound 
estimate of what is possible. We hope that future research considers these and other related 
issues in an attempt to find valuable forward-looking uses for social media monitoring data. 
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4.0  CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the two essays that make up this dissertation add to the discussion of 
marketing strategy beyond the traditional boundaries of the firm by considering the effect of firm 
relational positions on their financial risk, and by providing a relationship-enhanced forecasting 
tool for brand sentiment valence in the digital environment, a known leading indicator of firm 
performance.  
Consistent with previous works incorporating social networks into the analyses of 
marketing strategies and phenomena (Swaminathan and Moorman 2009; Stephen and Toubia 
2010; Mallapragrada, Grewal, and Lillien 2011), the inclusion of this broader and more complex 
perspective provides a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the marketing environment. 
 For example, in the first essay I find that marketing alliances do reduce two 
components of equity risk: idiosyncratic and systematic risks. This result falls in line with much 
of the existing belief in the marketing and alliances literatures. However, there is also empirical 
support for situations where marketing alliances can increase firm risk. This increasing level of 
risk is explained by the expanded perspective provided by the incorporation of data on the 
broader network of firm alliances while examining the consequences of alliance announcements. 
The models presented suggest that firms experience risk-reduction benefits from alliance 
announcements when they engage with novel partners and forge new connections in their 
networks. This finding does suggest the structure (i.e. the pattern of connections in the network) 
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is important, given that the alternative, or the relational repeated partnerships offer no risk-
reduction benefits in the equity market. The caveat, or course, is that while a relational focus 
does not help the firm if the goal is risk minimization; it is likely central to other managerial 
concerns, such as the development of trust with the partner firm (Wuyts, Stremersch, and Dutta 
2004), the implementation of alliance-related initiatives, etc.    
 Furthermore, by incorporating other measure of network position, both for a focal 
firm and its partner, I was able to show that equity risk can change as a function of the network 
structure. For example, a firm whose direct partners are highly interconnected occupies a 
dangerous position. Referred to as a high ego-network density position, this firm relies on non-
diversified partners for its business processes (from previous alliance formation), while its 
partners also rely on one another. While this clique-like structure of firms is efficient, any failure 
or issue arising within a single firm will be quickly felt by all network members, and then felt 
again as aftershocks through its other network partners as they also suffer due to this unique 
failure. This inability to “dissipate” unanticipated shocks through more diversified connections 
appears in this study as an exponential increase in firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk, as it is 
unrelated to the broader financial market. 
 That is not to say that the structure of the alliance network has no information on 
the firm’s relationship with the broader financial market in macro-economic forces. In fact, a 
firm’s selection of a partner is crucial in this connection, as it is the partner’s increasing ego-
network density (interconnectivity) that leads us to expect greater levels of exposure to market 
level risk. The intuition again lies in the fact that an allying partner suggests connections with 
novel areas of the economy, and as exposure increases, so does risk. Interestingly, this 
perspective sets up a trade-off in the selection of partners and network formation relative to 
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expected risk consequences: a novel connection might alleviate firm-specific risk, while 
increasing the firm’s exposure to market and economy-level risk. 
 Marketing managers can make use of this information in the process of selecting 
the correct partner for the intended alliance by augmenting the requirement of a potential partner 
firm’s resources and capabilities with an understanding of both firm’s alliance network positions, 
and the equity market consequences of the choice. However, these finding can be seen as 
particularly worrisome because practitioners are not currently trained to observe and account for 
their own, or much less their partner networks, but rather only their own immediate connections 
under a portfolio assumption. This difference could lead to a prediction of risk benefits arising 
from an alliance formation, while the actual result might turn out quite differently. Given this 
different managerial perspective, it is possible that many firms operate under much greater risk 
than they account for. 
 As an attempt to place to power of information from social networks at the hands 
of marketing managers, the second essay provides a novel way to utilize data the firm already 
own and metrics managers already track, by enhancing an online sentiment valence prediction 
model with brand network information.  
 While the popular use of social media and other digital communication methods 
have skyrocketed, marketing researchers have been preoccupied with linking the dynamics of 
this online conversation to important marketing outcomes. Research in this domain has shown 
that the quantity and nature of online word of mouth can impact both future sales and new 
product adoption (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2004, 2009; Liu 2006; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; 
Trusov, Bucklin and Pauwels 2009; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011; Stephen and 
Galak 2012; Moe and Trusov 2011).  And while these sales would impact firm performance and 
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firm value through an traditional firm valuation pathway, additional research as also shown that 
online firm mentions can also impact stock market performance by influencing investors, who 
value timely information  (e.g., Luo 2007, 2009; Tirunillai and Tellis 2011; McAlister, Sonnier 
and Shively 2012).  
 Marketing managers do increasingly recognize the value of monitoring online 
conversations around their brands, and in taking an active role in shaping this conversation for 
the benefit of the firm. However, forming predictions for the volume and valence of this 
conversation can be tricky, leading to often inaccurate and marginally useful forecasts.  
 While naïve forecasting models can be improved by incorporating autoregressive 
components, they can also be further improved by the addition of structural and relational brand 
network information.  While the relationship between brands is not something we can observe 
directly, we can extract a time varying brand-by-brand relational network structure from the 
pattern of online conversations about these brands. From these networks, we can then extract 
information about number of other brands it is connected with, as well as how interconnected 
these brands are, with the ultimate goal of using this knowledge to improve forecast accuracy. 
 By providing a more accurate forecasting model for this leading performance 
indicator, managers can, for the first time, get ahead of this fast moving online conversation and 
take corrective action in case of a negative forecast, potentially saving eventual sales, and 
avoiding loss of value.  
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4.1 NETWORKS AND FIRM VALUE 
 In response to an increasing pressure on managers to demonstrate marketing’s 
ability to provide financial returns and improve firm value, this dissertation highlights the benefit 
of incorporating a network perspective to marketing management and the pursuit of improved 
firm performance and greater firm value.  
The marketing literature concerned with the financial performance of marketing 
activities has adopted a framework for value surrounding the manager’s ability to generate cash 
flows for the firm that are either greater in volume, realized sooner, or more certain in nature 
(Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 1998), with the additional understanding that improvements 
along any of these characteristics would also be valued by investors, and firm value would also 
increase in the financial market. The work presented here showcases the impact of two distinct 
networks under the purview of the marketing manager: one composed of marketing alliance 
partners, and a second composed of competing brands in the marketplace; each with the 
potential to alter firm cash flows, and ultimately, firm value. 
 First, the network of alliance partners (reflecting past connections and 
interconnections) has already been shown to improve firm value through greater abnormal 
returns given certain network configurations (Swaminathan and Moorman 2009). This work 
expands upon this view by highlighting the conditions under which marketing alliances and the 
network of previous alliances gives rise to lower or greater levels of firm uncertainty, which is 
tied to firm performance, survival, and overall value. This goes beyond the classic financial 
expectation of greater risk accompanying greater returns, and exposes scenarios where marketing 
is able to generate greater returns while simultaneously lowering the firm’s risk exposure, and 
thus providing greater firm value through two proposed avenues. 
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 Secondly, this work also shows that a network of brands connected in social 
media can aid in the understanding of word of mouth. This is significant because word of mouth 
volume and valence is informative of future intent to purchase (Godes and Mayzlin 2004, 2009; 
Liu 2006; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), which has a clear and direct connection to the volume 
and volatility of cash flows generated by the firm. By utilizing a network of brands to understand 
future word of mouth valence, a manager can then generate expectations for future-future cash 
flow performance, and take corrective actions if necessary, which leads to improved performance 
and increased value. 
Even if marketing performance has not appeared as a MSI research priority in the 
previous two years, this understanding continues to be important for academics and practitioners 
alike. Now, more than ever, the performance of marketing activity and the firm by consequence 
is conditional on what the firm faces outside of its boundaries, whether it be through networked 
partners and their assets and capabilities, how the brand is perceived online and how that 
conversation is shifting. Looking beyond the firm and understanding these complex relationships 
as well as their implications for firm decision-making and performance should only help 
managers; not only now, but as the business environment continues to grow in interconnectivity 
and complexity. 
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APPENDIX A 
CORRECTING FOR SELECTION BIASES 
Our first-stage selection model has firm’s entry into strategic alliances as a function of 
various factors, including firm size, firm profitability, prior alliance experience, etc. We use the 
entire sample of public firms within the industries we are focusing on and examine whether a 
firm announced a marketing alliance within each firm-year combination. We conducted a probit 
regression of the propensity to form alliances. We then calculated an inverse Mills ratio from this 
selection equation and included it in the second-stage selection correction, which focuses on 
partner selection. In the first-stage, we find that the  overall model was significant (–2LL = 
1769.663, χ2 = 642.6923, p < .0001). As Table 11 shows, the results indicate a significant impact 
of firm sales (b = .00001, p < .0001), net income (b = .00014, p < .001), intangible assets (b = 
.00001, p < .01), leverage (b = –.309, p < .001), and number of prior alliances (b = –.002, p < 
.10). Some variables were not significant, including strategic emphasis, marketing resource 
intensity, solvency, and return on assets. We also controlled for year dummy variables. We used 
this probit estimation procedure to estimate the inverse Mills ratio selectivity parameter, which is 
included in the next selection bias estimation model as a control variable.   
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Table 11 First-Stage Selection Bias: Propensity to Form Alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second-stage selection model involves modeling the likelihood of selecting a specific 
partner. We focus on the firms that actually announced an alliance. We then controlled for the 
likelihood of choosing a specific partner. To do this, we calculated an inverse Mills ratio by 
estimating a selection equation, in which we model the probability of choosing the particular 
partner from a set of potential available similar partners in that industry in that year. Because 
data on potential partners were not directly available, we constructed a set of similar partners in 
the same industry and assumed that these were potential alternatives to the chosen partner. The 
Note:  N=36771 
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selection equation involved identifying partner firms with a similar size and asset base (firms 
whose size was ±25% of the selected partner) in the same industry as that of the partner firm. 
Then, we estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable was whether a given firm 
was selected versus not selected from among the various firms that could be potential alliance 
partners. The independent variables for the probit estimation included (1) the relative size of 
partners, (2) horizontal alliances, (3) repeat partnerships, (4) alliance with product development, 
and (5) alliance experience. We also controlled for time effects through a series of year 
dummies. We conducted separate analyses, controlling for firm effects. Specifically, we 
estimated selectivity parameters in a model in which we did not control for firm effects and 
another model in which we controlled for firm effects. Both models yielded selectivity 
parameters that were highly correlated (r = .95); therefore, we used the more parsimonious 
specification in which we did not include firm-level random effects (for results, see Table 12). 
We used the estimated parameters from the probit estimation to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, 
which we then entered into the models to account for possible selection bias. 
As Table 12 shows, network density was significant (β1 = .569, p < .001), network 
density2 was significant (β2 = –1.283, p < .0001), network efficiency2 was negative and 
significant (β4 = –1.609, p < .001), network strength was negative and significant (β5 = –.162, p < 
.001), network centrality was negative and significant (β6 = –.006, p < .001), horizontal alliance 
was negative and significant (β7 = –.617, p < .001), product development component was 
positive and significant (β8 = .739, p < .001), firm size was positive and significant (β9 = .008, p 
< .001), repeat alliance was positive and significant (β11 = .713, p < .001), and the alliance 
formation probability was also positive and significant (β12 = .093, p < .001).  
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Table 12 Second-Stage Selection Bias: Partner Selection Bias (Probit Estimates) 
 
Note:  N=2259 
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APPENDIX B 
OBSERVABLE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF MARKETING ALLIANCE FORMATION 
ON FIRM RISK 
While our main study involves the impact of marketing alliance announcements on a 
firm’s equity risk and employs the financial market as an incentive-compatible crowd-sourced 
indicator of expected firm consequences, we also analyzed actual observed risk consequences for 
the firm. By doing so, we can examine how the realities of equity risk created by investors’ 
decisions in the financial market can differ from two dimensions of risk the firm experience:10 
cash flow volatility and credit risk (which incorporates a measure of financial health and 
probability of default). 
 
 
                                                
10 These two additional dimensions of risk are distinct from idiosyncratic and systematic risks. These measures are 
not related to measures of equity and do not rely on the financial market but rather arise from operational 
considerations. While idiosyncratic and systematic risk pertain to the “source” of risk (firm-specific and broad 
economy forces, respectively), these measures are more closely related to notions of firm uncertainty (cash flow 
volatility) and vulnerability (credit rating).  
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B.1.1 Dependent Variables 
Cash flow variability. We calculate cash flow variability as the standard deviation of a 
firm’s net income normalized by its assets, over 12 reporting quarters following a marketing 
alliance announcement, thus covering three calendar years from the time of announcement.  
Long-term firm riskiness. We calculate the firm’s long-term riskiness as the average 
credit rating held over the three-year period (36 issued reports of credit worthiness) following a 
marketing alliance announcement. This variable ranges from 2 (equivalent to a credit rating of 
AAA) to 27 (equivalent to a credit rating of D); the higher this value, the riskier is the firm. 
B.1.2 Model Estimation 
Modeling the long-term volatility of cash flows presents an additional complication in 
that the dependent variable is not normally distributed. Therefore, we log-transform this 
dependent variable before regressing it on the same independent variables presented in our main 
study. Clustered errors accounted for the lack of independence. 
 Last, we model the long-term credit risk of the firm, which is an ordinal measure, 
meaning that a AAA credit rating is less risky than a AA+ rating; however, we cannot assume 
that the “distance” between these two values is equivalent to the “distance” between the next 
interval of ratings (i.e., AA+ rating in relation to a AA rating). To account for the characteristics 
of this dependent variable, we employ an ordinal logit model with clustered errors. Again, we 
used the same independent variables presented previously in the final model. 
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B.1.3 Results 
Future (three-year) cash flow volatility. Table 13 presents the results from the model 
examining the impact of marketing alliance formation on the firm’s long-term cash flow 
volatility. Cumulative abnormal returns are positive and significant (π1jk = 6.283, p < .001), 
which we expected because future volatility is priced in the market and should be accompanied 
by increased returns as recompense. Repeat alliance is significant and negative (π3jk = –3.541, p 
< .001). The firm’s network centrality is both significant and negative (βp2k = –.002, p < .001), as 
is its network efficiency (βp5k = –.736, p < .001). These results are consistent with the notion 
presented previously that a firm creating a larger local network with partners in diverse industries 
can lower its cash flow volatility. A partner’s network density also affects the firm’s cash flow 
volatility, which is significant and negative at lower levels (βp7k = –1.846, p < .01) but significant 
and positive at higher levels (βp8k = 1.744, p < .05). For alliance types, the indicator for “other” 
alliance types (e.g., licensing, customer service, sales, bundling, international) is negative and 
significant (π8jk = –.132, p < .05), while joint marketing and market access alliances are negative 
and only marginally significant (π6jk = –.219, p < .10; π7jk = –.260, p < .10, respectively). Last, 
the latent variable capturing partner selectivity bias is both negative and significant in this model 
(βp9k = –.098, p < .001). 
Future (three-year) credit risk. Table 14 presents the results for the model examining the 
impact of marketing alliance formation on long-term credit rating. Again, cumulative abnormal 
returns are positive and significant (π1jk = 7.091, p < .001), while repeat partnerships are negative 
and significant (π3jk = –1.768, p < .01). A firm’s previous credit rating is a significant and 
positive predictor of its future credit rating (βp1k = .134, p < .001). The firm’s centrality is a 
significant and negative (βp2k = –.009, p < .001), as is the firm’s own network density (βp3k = –
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.740, p < .05). Furthermore, the firm’s network efficiency is negative and significant (βp5k = –
2.531, p < .01). Last, for alliance types, only joint marketing alliances reduce future credit risk, 
but only marginally (π6jk = –.443, p < .10).  
When we incorporate alliance experience into the models of future risk performance, we 
find that it has no impact on credit risk (βp10k = .000, n.s.) but is a significant contributor in 
reducing long-term cash flow variability (βp10k = –8.133, p < .05). 
 
Table 13 Long-Term Cash Flow Volatility (Three Years) Following a Marketing Alliance 
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Table 14 Future Credit Rating (Three Years) Following a Marketing Alliance 
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